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Full-Text Articles in Law

Cyberattacks And The Covert Action Statute: Toward A Domestic Legal Framework For Offensive Cyberoperations, Aaron P. Brecher Dec 2012

Cyberattacks And The Covert Action Statute: Toward A Domestic Legal Framework For Offensive Cyberoperations, Aaron P. Brecher

Michigan Law Review

Cyberattacks are capable of penetrating and disabling vital national infrastructure, causing catastrophic economic harms, and approximating the effects of war, all from remote locations and without the use of conventional weapons. They can be nearly impossible to attribute definitively to their sources and require relatively few resources to launch. The United States is vulnerable to cyberattacks but also uniquely capable of carrying out cyberattacks of its own. To do so effectively, the United States requires a legal regime that is well suited to cyberattacks' unique attributes and that preserves executive discretion while inducing the executive branch to coordinate with Congress ...


Security Council Resolution 1887 And The Quest For Nuclear Disarmament, Usman Ahmed, Raghav Thapar Apr 2012

Security Council Resolution 1887 And The Quest For Nuclear Disarmament, Usman Ahmed, Raghav Thapar

Michigan Journal of International Law

Nuclear weapons pose an increased international threat to security in the modem era. Cheap transportation and the opening of national borders for trade have made it easy for nuclear materials to cross national boundaries. Informal networks have sprouted up, facilitating the proliferation and exchange of nuclear materials and the technology required to turn those materials into weapons. Advances in technology have made it easier to enrich uranium, instilling concerns of increased nuclear weapons proliferation. These changes in technology, the development of informal nuclear networks, and lax security in safeguarding weapons by states such as Russia and Pakistan have fueled global ...


No Cause Of Action: Video Surveillance In New York City, Olivia J. Greer Jan 2012

No Cause Of Action: Video Surveillance In New York City, Olivia J. Greer

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

In 2010, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly announced a new network of video surveillance in the City. The new network would be able to prevent future terrorist attacks by identifying suspicious behavior before catastrophic events could take place. Kelly told reporters, "If we're looking for a person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days," and "[w]e're beginning to use software that can identify suspicious objects or behaviors." Gothamist later made a witticism of Kelly's statement, remarking, "Note to terrorists: red jackets are not ...


Detention Debates, Deborah N. Pearlstein Jan 2012

Detention Debates, Deborah N. Pearlstein

Michigan Law Review

Since the United States began detaining people in efforts it has characterized, with greater and lesser accuracy, as part of global counterterrorism operations, U.S. detention programs have spawned more than 200 different lawsuits producing 6 Supreme Court decisions, 4 major pieces of legislation, at least 7 executive orders across 2 presidential administrations, more than 100 books, 231 law review articles (counting only those with the word "Guantanamo" in the title), dozens of reports by nongovernmental organizations, and countless news and analysis articles from media outlets in and out of the mainstream. For those in the academic and policy communities ...


A Functional Approach To Targeting And Detention, Monica Hakimi Jan 2012

A Functional Approach To Targeting And Detention, Monica Hakimi

Articles

The international law governing when states may target to kill or preventively detain nonstate actors is in disarray. This Article puts much of the blame on the method that international law uses to answer that question. The method establishes different standards in four regulatory domains: (1) law enforcement, (2) emergency, (3) armed conflict for civilians, and (4) armed conflict for combatants. Because the legal standards vary, so too may substantive outcomes; decisionmakers must select the correct domain before determining whether targeting or detention is lawful. This Article argues that the "domain method" is practically unworkable and theoretically dubious. Practically, the ...