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University of Michigan Law School

2012

Business Organizations Law

Shareholders

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han Jan 2012

The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat

The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google.


A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer Jan 2012

A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This essay introduces the complex regulatory regime that governs the public sale of all securities, no matter how small the offeror. It is intended as a rudimentary roadmap for the start-up or its counsel and will, hopefully, help to illuminate the traps for the unwary while providing an overview of the regulatory universe in which securities crowdfunding will operate.


Pathway To Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions In The People's Republic Of China, Donald C. Clarke, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2012

Pathway To Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions In The People's Republic Of China, Donald C. Clarke, Nicholas C. Howson

Book Chapters

Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly authorized in the PRC’s 2006 Company Law effective January 1, 2006. In addition, we describe the very unique ecology of enterprise organization and corporate governance in modern China, and critique the formal design of the derivative action and offer reform suggestions. We find the design of the Chinese derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects, innovative and …