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When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, David A. Harris Jan 2001

When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, David A. Harris

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

The author proposes that in an ongoing debate on questions concerning the possibility of racial or other types of invidious discrimination by public institutions, we should apply a prima facie standard to these claims in the public arena. In other words, if African Americans or Latinos say that they have been the victims of racial profiling, we should not ask for conclusive proof in the strictest statistical sense; rather, if they can present some credible evidence beyond anecdotes, some statistics that indicate that we may, indeed, have a problem, the burden should then shift to the public institution-here, law enforcement …


"Suitable Targets"? Parallels And Connections Between "Hate" Crimes And "Driving While Black", Lu-In Wang Jan 2001

"Suitable Targets"? Parallels And Connections Between "Hate" Crimes And "Driving While Black", Lu-In Wang

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Essay seeks to show that there is less to some of these apparent differences than meets the eye. While hate crimes may tend to be less routine and more violent than discriminatory traffic stops, closer examination of each shows the need to complicate our understanding of both. The work of social scientists who have studied bias-motivated violence and of legal scholars who have studied racial profiling- prominent among them my fellow panelist, Professor David A. Harris- reveals striking similarities and connections between the two practices. In particular, both hate crimes and racial profiling tend to be condemned only at …


Striking A Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard For "Location Plus Evasion" Terry Stops, Mia Carpiniello Jan 2001

Striking A Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard For "Location Plus Evasion" Terry Stops, Mia Carpiniello

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Randall Susskind originally proposed the "reasonable African American standard” for Terry stops as a way to minimize racial disparities in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This paper will expand upon Susskind's suggested standard within the specific context of "location plus evasion" stops, in which suspects are stopped upon flight in a high-crime neighborhood. Part one will present the reasonable Black person standard in the context of Illinois v. Wardlow, a recent "location plus evasion case." Part one will then show how this alternative standard better accounts for Wardlow's "raced" decision to flee, the police officers' "raced" decision to stop him, and …


Subtracting Race From The "Reasonable Calculus": An End To Racial Profiling? United States V. Montero-Camargo 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) Cert. Denied Sub Nom, Elisabeth R. Calcaterra, Natalie G. Mitchell Jan 2001

Subtracting Race From The "Reasonable Calculus": An End To Racial Profiling? United States V. Montero-Camargo 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) Cert. Denied Sub Nom, Elisabeth R. Calcaterra, Natalie G. Mitchell

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Case Note presents the facts of Montero-Camargo, describes the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court in historical context, and analyzes the effect of the Court's holding. The Case Note argues that while the Ninth Circuit's decision to prohibit the use of race as a factor in determining the reasonableness calculus in traffic stops is progressive in spirit, implementing the decision will be difficult. Thus far, mechanisms designed to limit officers' use of race in traffic stops have been ineffective and have left victims with little recourse, resulting in a disproportionate number of innocent African American and Latino drivers …


An Empirically Based Comparison Of American And European Regulatory Approaches To Police Investigation, Christopher Slobogin Jan 2001

An Empirically Based Comparison Of American And European Regulatory Approaches To Police Investigation, Christopher Slobogin

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article takes a comparative and empirical look at two of the most significant methods of police investigation: searches for and seizures of tangible evidence and interrogation of suspects. It first compares American doctrine regulating these investigative tools with the analogous rules predominant in Europe. It then discusses research on the American system that sheds light on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two regulatory regimes.


Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look At The Majority And Dissenting Opinions In Dickerson, Yale Kamisar Jan 2001

Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look At The Majority And Dissenting Opinions In Dickerson, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Over the years, Miranda v. Arizona1 has been criticized both for going too far2 and for not going far enough.3 Nevertheless, on the basis of talks with many criminal procedure professors in the sixteen months between the time a panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld a statute (18 U.S.C. § 3501) purporting to "overrule" Miranda and a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court overturned that ruling in the case of Dickerson v. United States,4 I am convinced that most criminal procedure professors wanted the Supreme Court to do what it did-"reaffirm" Miranda. This is not surprising. As Professor Grano once …


From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar Jan 2001

From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar

Articles

Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson] court-watchers knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases [the cases viewing Miranda's requirements as not rights protected by the Constitution, but merely "prophylactic rules"] or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn't "have to" do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.