Law Commons^™

Commercial Treaties And Foreign Companies: The Mutually Reinforcing Principles Of Remedial Antitrust And National Treatment, Alan Van Kampen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that greater appreciation for the nature and importance of national treatment obligations will compel tribunals fashioning antitrust relief to provide more suitably for foreign firms, and thus avoid straining international trade relations. Moreover, because antitrust relief and national treatment objectives are mutually reinforcing, greater recognition of national treatment requirements should improve remedial orders from the standpoint of antitrust economics. Meeting national treatment requirements should place little added burden on the antitrust tribunal; it must merely extend impartial economic analysis to all market suppliers, not just domestic firms.

This Note explores methods to ensure that antitrust relief orders …

Mobility Factors In Antitrust Cases: Assessing Market Power In Light Of Conditions Affecting Entry And Fringe Expansion, William H. Wentz

Michigan Law Review

To assist courts and litigants in developing and utilizing information on mobility factors in a meaningful manner, I have attempted in this Article to outline a basic approach for analyzing the competitive and efficiency significance of mobility factors in a litigative context. In Part I, I lay the necessary foundation: discussing the importance of mobility factors in accepted economic theory, explaining the sources of the current confusion and controversy about "entry barriers" and deriving from the debate areas of fundamental agreement among economists. Building on this common ground, I develop in Part II a basic approach to consideration of mobility …

Antitrust Suits By Targets Of Tender Offers, Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel

Michigan Law Review

We explore in this Article the basis and consequences of the target's suit under the antitrust laws. We approach the question from the perspective of federal antitrust law and state corporation law.

We argue in Part I that the target is a singularly poor "private attorney general" because it is a beneficiary, not a victim, of any violation. An antitrust suit thus must be understood as an attempt by managers to defend their own positions, not as an attempt to vindicate the public interest. In the jargon of antitrust, the target is not a victim of "antitrust injury" and therefore …

Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13), undertakes to outlaw price "discrimination" upon proof of threatened injury to competition, and subject to specified defenses. Lawyers often bewail the fact that administration of this statute frequently fails to conform to an economist's notion of discrimination. For the most part, the complaints are addressed to the clear fact that, as drafted and interpreted, the statute wreaks unnecessary damage. In the name of protecting competition, competition and economic efficiency are often curtailed.