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Full-Text Articles in Law
Multinational Firms And Tax Havens, Anna Gumpert, James R. Hines Jr., Monika Schnitzer
Multinational Firms And Tax Havens, Anna Gumpert, James R. Hines Jr., Monika Schnitzer
Articles
Multinational firms with operations in high-tax countries can benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens, though this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20.4% of German multinational firms have any tax haven affiliates. Among German manufacturing firms, a 1 percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 2.3% greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax avoidance incentives and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. The relationship is less strong for firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income.
Arguments For And Against Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Arguments For And Against Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
The tax on dividends from the active income of controlled foreign corporations meets the criteria for a bad tax: It raises little revenue but significantly affects taxpayer behavior in undesirable ways.
Territoriality: For And Against, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Territoriality: For And Against, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
The tax on dividends from the active income of controlled foreign corporations meets the criteria for a bad tax: It raises little revenue but significantly affects taxpayer behavior in undesirable ways.
The Effective Tax Rate Of The Largest Us And Eu Multinationals, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yaron Lahav
The Effective Tax Rate Of The Largest Us And Eu Multinationals, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yaron Lahav
Articles
The United States has the second highest statutory corporate tax rate in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) (after Japan).1 This has not always been the case. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the U.S. rate from 46% to 34%,2 the United States had one of the lowest statutory corporate tax rates in the OECD.3 In the past twenty-five years, however, the U.S. rate has remained essentially unchanged (it was raised to 35% in 1993),4 while most other OECD countries reduced their statutory rate so that the OECD average statutory corporate tax rate is 25.1%.
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.
Back To The Future? The Potential Revival Of Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Back To The Future? The Potential Revival Of Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
Since 1994, the trend in the United States and other developed countries appears to be to reduce the scope of residence jurisdiction and increase the emphasis on source jurisdiction. If this trend continues, these countries are likely to move toward territoriality and decrease the emphasis on their CFC rules. In the author’s opinion, the reason for this trend is political and economic, not legal. It is part of tax competition, specifically the competition to be the headquarters jurisdiction for multinationals. The author also thinks, however, that it is not necessary to go down this road because the solution to the …
Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
In October 2005, a group of distinguished tax experts from the European Union and the United States, who had never met before, convened at the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on "Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Justice Tax Jurisprudence." The purpose of the conference was to shed comparative light on the very different approaches taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the U.S. Supreme Court to the question of fiscal federalism. The conference was sponsored by the U-M Law School, U-M's European Union Center, and Harvard Law School's …