Law Commons^™

Is There A Delaware Effect For Controlled Firms?, Edward Fox

Articles

The impact of Delaware incorporation on firm value remains a central question in corporate law. Despite the difficulty scholars have had in agreeing on an answer to this question, there is a consensus that Delaware has long enjoyed stable and important advantages in the expertise of its judiciary and its extensive case law. These advantages are believed to be particularly important for firms with a controlling shareholder. This Article attempts to empirically measure the effect of Delaware incorporation on these controlled firms and thus helps us understand the market value of Delaware’s judiciary and case law. It finds, surprisingly, that …

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …

Solely Beneficial: How Benefit Corporations May Change The Duty Of Care Analysis For Traditional Corporate Directors In Delaware, Dustin Womack

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Rather than adding to the voluminous literature assessing the necessity of benefit corporations themselves or the possible liability of their directors, this Note concerns itself only with how benefit corporations will impact the fiduciary duty of care analysis for the directors of traditional corporations constituted in the state of Delaware. Further, this Note is only concerned with liability arising from claims alleging that a day-to-day directorial decision resulted in a breach of the duty of care. As such, this Note does not address any other potential liability predicated on other situations or duties. Finally, this Note provides general background information …

Contracting Out Of The Fiduciary Duty Of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis Of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel Rauterberg, Eric Talley

Articles

For centuries, the duty of loyalty has been the hallowed centerpiece of fiduciary obligation, widely considered one of the few “mandatory” rules of corporate law. That view, however, is no longer true. Beginning in 2000, Delaware dramatically departed from tradition by granting incorporated entities a statutory right to waive a crucial part of the duty of loyalty: the corporate opportunities doctrine. Other states have since followed Delaware’s lead, similarly permitting firms to execute “corporate opportunity waivers.” Surprisingly, more than fifteen years into this reform experiment, no study has attempted to either systematically measure the corporate response to these reforms or …

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …

The Delaware Series Llc: Sophisticated And Flexible Business Planning, Ann E. Conaway, Peter I. Tsoflias

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The authors conclude that the Delaware series supplies a beneficial, efficient use of a combined contractual Delaware entity form when pooled with sensible, informed planning by sophisticated business attorneys. Such benefits are particularly noticeable in investment vehicles where managers embark to minimize risk by diversifying the fund’s assets or receive funding with specific covenants attached that limit the acceptable uses of the funds. The series is not, however, for general practitioners who have the occasional client wishing for the latest benefit Delaware has to offer its investors. To provide context, Parts II-IV of this article provide a brief overview of …

Failure Of A "Basic Assumption": The Emerging Standard For Excuse Under Mae Provisions, Nathan Somogie

Michigan Law Review

The onset of the current economic crisis has led many strategic and financial acquirers to reconsider the desirability of transactions to which they had previously agreed. Because many of these agreements contain substantial termination fees, buyers have increasingly sought to be excused from their contractual obligations by invoking Material Adverse Effect ("MAE") provisions. Reliance on MAE clauses as a basis for termination has historically been risky due to a lack of clarity in the case law regarding the standard for excuse under such provisions. A recent decision by the Delaware Chancery Court, Hexion v. Huntsman, the third in a …

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.

The Use Of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, Dana M. Muir, Cindy A. Schipani

Michigan Law Review

This Article focuses on the regulatory use of finance theory, particularly the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"), in two areas where securities pricing is at issue: shareholder appraisal cases and the use of employer stock in benefit plans. Regarding shareholder appraisal cases, the Article finds that the Delaware courts seem to implicitly respect the principles of EMH when ascertaining the fair value of stock, but recognize that markets cannot operate efficiently if information is withheld. Regarding employer stock in benefit plans, it concentrates on the explicit adoption of EMH by the Department of Labor to exempt directed trustees from traditional duties …

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …

Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting, notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer. Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made the costs of being …

Misreading The Williams Act, Lyman Johnson, David Millon

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the emerging controversy over preemption of the most potent of recent antitakeover laws, the so-called business combination statutes recently passed by Delaware, New York, and other states, and Pennsylvania's director-approval statute. After examining the strategy employed by the states to shield these statutes from constitutional attack, we consider the issues raised by the preemption claim and the arguments currently being advanced by the SEC and others in favor of preemption. Resolving the preemption controversy requires inquiry into the original meaning and objectives of the Williams Act. We argue that this should involve attention not only to the …

Federal Chartering Revisited, Donald E. Schwartz

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The protections that corporation law provided to shareholders and to our economic community against the excesses and complacency of corporate directors and managers have undergone a general weakening. Although it is uncertain whether the ALI can accomplish effective and meaningful reforms, this effort may be the most important attempt by the corporate community to reform itself.

Corporate Auctions And Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, Steven G. Bradbury

Michigan Law Review

This Note proposes a rationale and a methodology for applying the business judgment rule when directors resist a hostile bid during the auction phase of a control contest. Part I examines the changes that occur in the responsibilities of target directors when a corporate auction is initiated. This Part describes the Unocal business judgment rule test and discusses its usefulness in the auction phase of a takeover. While the test requires modification if it is to complement effectively the auction-phase duties announced in Revlon, this Part suggests that the business judgment rule continues to be relevant and important during …

Limiting Directors' Duty Of Care Liability: An Analysis Of Delaware's Charter Amendment Approach, Craig W. Hammond

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note explores the corporate law principles guiding the amendment of section 102(b)(7) and considers what effects this statute will have on the investor-director relationship. The Note focuses on whether this reform measure excessively protects directors at the expense of shareholders.

Part I analyzes the neoclassical economic view of the contractual relationship between stockholders and management that serves as the theoretical justification of section 102(b)(7). Part II proposes a modification of the Delaware statute that would provide for periodic shareholder review of charter amendments limiting liability.

Fiduciary Ideology In Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, Victor Brudney

Michigan Law Review

The fiduciary role in which corporate insiders are cast in their dealings with, or affecting, their corporations embraces a multitude of parts. Hence the range of restrictions on their conduct varies from inhibitions as rigorous as those imposed on express trustees to limitations almost as flexible as those governing arm's length dealings among strangers. As has often been pointed out, the characterization of a corporate officer, a director, or a person controlling the corporation as a "fiduciary" does not define his status with precision; rather, it sets a tone to his role and suggests the existence of obligations and of …

Corporations - Appraisal Statutes - Elements In Valuation Of Corporate Stock, John C. Baity

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this comment is to consider the elements of stock valuation generally applicable under the statutory appraisal remedies, and to analyze in some detail the interpretation of such a statute in one jurisdiction-Delaware.

Corporations - Stock Options - Requirements Of Consideration For Employee Options, George D. Miller, Jr. S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The Delaware court, in two recent decisions, has indicated what may be an increasingly strict attitude toward employee stock options, particularly when granted to executive officers or directors. It will be the purpose of this comment to examine the significance of these decisions, and to attempt to determine the extent of the change wrought by them.

Federal Procedure-Venue Of Corporations-Applicability Of 28 U.S.C. §1391(C) To Plaintiff Corporations, Charles E. Oldfather S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff, trustee in bankruptcy of a Delaware corporation, brought a contract action based on diversity of citizenship in an Ohio district court. Defendant is a partnership, whose partners are all residents of states other than Delaware. Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that venue was improperly laid. The court, relying on 28 U.S.C. §139I(c), held: motion to dismiss overruled. "Since the district where plaintiff is doing business . . . is the 'residence of the corporation for venue purposes,' this action may be properly maintained here [Ohio].'' Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., (D.C. …

Corporations--Shareholders-Effect On Voting Trust Agreement Of Inability To Transfer Shares To The Voting Trustees, Peter Van Domelen

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff filed a petition in equity attacking his removal as a director and president of the defendant corporation on the grounds that such removal was brought about through the exercise of an alleged invalid voting trust agreement The plaintiff and another shareholder, each owning fifty per cent of the stock in the defendant corporation, had entered into a voting trust agreement by which they appointed themselves and a third party as voting trustees. At the time the trust agreement was executed, all of the stock was on deposit with an escrow agent subject to an existing escrow contract. Plaintiff challenged …

Corporations--Corporate Policy, The "Cure-All" For Proxy Solicitation Ailments, David M. Michaelson S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

All too often lawyers and students of law are inclined to assume that some principle or formula· has become so deeply rooted in the law that it has acquired a sanctity which gives it an all-embracive effect, a "cure-all," as it were, for legal ailments. This has been the usual approach when the question has arisen of the propriety of spending corporate funds to solicit proxies. The ever-faithful panacea has been to say, quite automatically, that where the intra-corporate contest is concerned with matters of policy as distinguished from personnel of management, then corporate funds may be used to inform …

Corporations-Redeemable Stock-Fiduciary Duty Of Directors, Leroy H. Redfern S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

A federal district court judge introduced an opinion on the fiduciary obligation of corporate directors by stating that "the doctrine of the fiduciary relation is one of the most confused and entangled subjects in corporation law." In Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation the fiduciary duties of corporate directors were discussed extensively by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The court not only failed to terminate the confusion and clear the entanglement but may well have added to it by using the fiduciary concept in a new field.

Corporations-Derivative Suits-Who Is A Shareholder Under Federal Rule 23 (B), Kent Chandler, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff brought suit in a federal district court to enforce the rights of defendant, an Illinois corporation, to monies allegedly embezzled by its president and to certain shares of stock allegedly issued to him illegally. The complaint alleged that plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, "is now and has been at all times hereinafter complained of the owner of 6538 shares of the common stock of . . . defendant herein." Defendant, showing by affidavit that plaintiff had never been a shareholder of record, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to meet the requirements of federal rule 23 (b). The court …

Corporations--Voting Trusts--Non-Compliance With Statute As Basis For Judicial Termination, Robert K. Eifler S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Common stockholders of a corporation which had on December 15, 1938 made a valid five year extension of a voting trust agreement originally entered into on January 22, 1929 attempted on May 27, 1939, to extend further the agreement for an additional five years. Following a dispute over the election of corporate directors almost two years after the termination of the first extension, certain holders of voting trust certificates brought bills in chancery to compel redelivery of the common stock registered in the names of the voting trustees and to declare the invalidity of the election. Held, the instrument …

Corporations --Voting Trusts -- Non-Compliance With Statute As A Basis For Judicial Termination, Joseph R. Brookshire S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss the history of the voting trust, to recapitulate the controversy over its legality, or to examine the many grounds for termination of the trust. It is sufficient to say that in all but perhaps three states this important business device has been made legal by statute or by judicial decision. We are here concerned with finding the degree of statutory compliance necessary in order that the voting trust will be sustained.

Corporations - Stockholders' Suits - Effect Of Erie Railroad V. Tompkins On Federal Equity Rule 27, Leonard D. Verdier Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiffs filed a stockholders' bill in federal equity court to enforce certain rights of Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The individual defendants, directors of the corporation, were charged with having effected a plan to sell various Hearst properties to the corporation at excessive prices. Defendants moved to strike from the bill of complaint paragraphs referring to transactions which occurred prior to the date when plaintiffs acquired their stock. The motion was based on equity rule 27. The contention of counsel for plaintiffs was that rule 27 is based on the federal general law, which on this point conflicts …

Business Associations - Joint Adventure Distinguished From Partnership

Michigan Law Review

The defendants, husband and wife, agreed with the plaintiff for the construction and sale of a house on the wife's land, she to be paid a certain sum from the proceeds, and the husband and plaintiff to receive fair compensation for their work, with the balance, if any, to be divided between the husband and plaintiff. Held, that the agreement created a joint adventure between the plaintiff and the husband rather than a partnership. Garber v. Whittaker, (Del. 1934) 174 Atl. 34.

Corporations - Insolvency - Statutes Giving Priority To Wage Claims

Michigan Law Review

Statutes giving liens or preferences to wage claims upon the insolvency of corporations are found among the laws of many states. In reference to the priority established, these statutes can be divided into three classes: those specifically stating that the lien or preference created shall be prior to all other claims not secured by specific liens, those specifically stating that wage claims shall be superior to all other claims upon the property of the corporation, including mortgages, and those making wage claims a lien or preferred debt to be paid "before any other debt or debts." Under this last type …

Corporations -Apportionment Of Part Payment Of Purchase Price Of Stocks Bought In A Unit

Michigan Law Review

The defendant corporation entered into contracts for the sale of stock in blocks of three shares, two shares of first preferred at fifty dollars each par value and one share of second preferred at fifty dollars par value, the three shares to be sold in a unit for one hundred and thirty-five dollars. The contract contained an agreement that after six monthly payments had been made on the stock, upon default of the remaining payments the corporation would issue certificates of indebtedness for the amount paid in. In the dissolution of the corporation and the distribution of the assets, the …