Law Commons^™

The Unreasonable Case For A Reasonable Compensation Standard In The Public Company Context: Why It Is Unreasonable To Insist On Reasonableness, Stuart G. Lazar

Stuart Lazar

There is no question that corporate executives are well paid. But does high executive compensation mean excessive or unreasonable compensation? And if so, what is the solution to curbing the problem of excessive executive pay? More specifically, should the Internal Revenue Code be used as a means for regulating the actions of public companies?

This Article briefly explores these issues. In Part I, this Article provides a narrative of the excessive compensation debate. Without drawing a conclusion as to whether executive compensation is reasonably set or excessive in nature, Part I summarizes the history of public outrage surrounding executive pay. …

Irs Overhauls Spin-Off Ruling Guidelines, Stuart M. Finkelstein, Stuart G. Lazar

Stuart Lazar

No abstract provided.

Schooling Congress: The Current Landscape Of The Tax Treatment Of Higher Education Expenses And A Framework For Reform, Stuart G. Lazar

Stuart Lazar

Education may be a cornerstone of our society, but the tax treatment of higher education expenses does not appear to have resulted from an intellectual exercise that would make our nation’s educators’ proud. The Internal Revenue Code provides two separate, but equally unsatisfying, routes that allow taxpayers to offset their income with the costs of higher education. Where an individual can reduce her tax liability while receiving an education, the effect is to reduce significantly the cost of that education. First, where amounts spent on education qualify as an “ordinary and necessary business expense,” a taxpayer will be entitled to …

Business Lobbying As An Informational Public Good: Can Tax Deductions For Lobbying Expenses Promote Transparency?, Michael Halberstam, Stuart G. Lazar

Stuart Lazar

The view that “lobbying is essentially an informational activity” has persistently served the suggestion that lobbying provides a public good by educating legislators about policy and the consequences of legislation. In this article, we link a proposed tax reform with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote the kind of “information subsidy” that serves the public interest, while mitigating – at least to some extent – the distortion that may result from the imbalance of financial resources on the business side and other institutional contraints identified in the literature. We argue that corporate lobbying should be encouraged – by allowing business …