Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Collective action problems (1)
- Consensual rules (1)
- Coordination (1)
- Delegation (1)
- Environmental Law (1)
-
- Free rider (1)
- Government Regulation (1)
- Harmonization (1)
- Institutional form (1)
- Internal control (1)
- International regulation (1)
- Legitimacy (1)
- Litigation (1)
- Mutual recognition (1)
- Non-state action (1)
- Practice and Procedure (1)
- Principal-agent (1)
- Social norms (1)
- Standards (1)
- Treaties (1)
- Withdrawal (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Publish Or Perish, Gideon Parchomovsky
Globalization And The Design Of International Institutions, Cary Coglianese
Globalization And The Design Of International Institutions, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
In an increasingly globalized world, international rules and organizations have grown ever more crucial to the resolution of major economic and social concerns. How can leaders design international institutions that will effectively solve global regulatory problems? This paper confronts this question by presenting three major types of global problems, distinguishing six main categories of institutional forms that can be used to address these problems, and showing how the effectiveness of international institutions depends on achieving “form-problem” fit. Complicating that fit will be the tendency of nation states to prefer institutional forms that do little to constrain their sovereignty. Yet the …
Incentives To Settle Under Joint And Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis Of Superfund Litigation, Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman
Incentives To Settle Under Joint And Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis Of Superfund Litigation, Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman
All Faculty Scholarship
Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settlements and is therefore likely to increase the program 's already high litigation costs per site. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending on the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two-defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants. This extension allows us to test the theoretical model empirically using data on Superfund litigation. We find that joint and several …