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Legislation

Statutory interpretation

Cornell University Law School

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Audiences Of Statutes, David S. Louk Dec 2019

The Audiences Of Statutes, David S. Louk

Cornell Law Review

Although a maxim of statutory drafting is to identify the relevant audience and draft so that the audience can "get the message," conventional theories of statutory interpretation often overlook important considerations about how statutes communicate and delegate to a diverse range of intended audiences. Statutes exist to change the conduct and behavior of many kinds of intended audiences, including administrative agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement officers, corporations, interest groups, lawyers, and laypeople. Influenced by lessons from the philosophies of law and language, this Article contends that Judicial statutory interpretation serves an important yet underappreciated role in providing a …


The Immorality Of Textualism, Andrei Marmor Dec 2005

The Immorality Of Textualism, Andrei Marmor

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Are Housekeepers Like Judges?, Stephen P. Garvey Jul 1997

Are Housekeepers Like Judges?, Stephen P. Garvey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Professor Greenawalt proposes that we look at interpretation "from the bottom up." By taking a close look at informal relationships between an authority and his or her agent, and how the agent "faithfully performs" instructions within such relationships, he hopes to gain insight into the problems surrounding the interpretation of legal directives. The analysis of "faithful performance" in informal contexts which Professor Greenawalt presents in From the Bottom Up is the first step in a larger project. His next step is to see what lessons the interpretation of instructions in informal contexts has for law. This Comment tries to contribute …


The Argument From Ordinary Meaning In Statutory Interpretation, Robert S. Summers, Geoffrey Marshall Oct 1992

The Argument From Ordinary Meaning In Statutory Interpretation, Robert S. Summers, Geoffrey Marshall

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.