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The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis
The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note explores whether …
The Severability Of Legislative Veto Provisions: An Examination Of The Congressional Budget And Impoundment Control Act Of 1974, Steven W. Pelak
The Severability Of Legislative Veto Provisions: An Examination Of The Congressional Budget And Impoundment Control Act Of 1974, Steven W. Pelak
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note examines the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision (section 1013(b)) in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, and discusses section 1013(b)'s and Title X's severability from the Act. Part I demonstrates that Chadha invalidates section 1013(b). Part II outlines the traditional severability doctrine. Part III proposes a refined model of the severability doctrine with which to resolve severability conflicts involving legislative veto provisions. Part IV applies the proposed severability model to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, and concludes that section 1O13(b)'s unconstitutionality requires that the entire Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act fall.