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From Constitutional Listening To Constitutional Learning, Leigh Jenco
From Constitutional Listening To Constitutional Learning, Leigh Jenco
Chicago-Kent Law Review
In this article, I point out some limitations of Michael Dowdle's "listening" model, particularly its basis in the "principle of charity." I try to show that listening, as well as the principle of charity, are inadvertently passive and one-sided exercises that seem to have little similarity to the deeply self-transformative "learning" Dowdle urges us to undertake. I go on to suggest other ways of accomplishing the goals Dowdle sets for this project. Specifically, I develop the "self-reflexive approach" to think about how we might change ourselves—our conversations, our terms, our concerns—in addition to, and in the process of, learning from …
Constitutional Listening, Michael W. Dowdle
Constitutional Listening, Michael W. Dowdle
Chicago-Kent Law Review
This article explores a particular methodology of comparative constitutional analysis that it calls "constitutional listening." Derived from the interpretive "principle of charity," constitutional listening involves interpreting constitutional discourse of other polities in their best light. This includes not simply polities whose constitutional structures and values resemble our own, but perhaps even more importantly, polities and constitutional systems whose values and structures seem alien to us. The value of this methodology, it is argued, lies in its ability to expand our understanding of the diversity of experiences that have gone into the human project of constitutionalism, and in the diversity of …
From Constitutional Listening To Moral Listening, Roy Tseng
From Constitutional Listening To Moral Listening, Roy Tseng
Chicago-Kent Law Review
In order to provide comments on Michael Dowdle's account of "Constitutional Listening," this paper aims to establish three counter-arguments. First of all, in contrast to Dowdle's particularly narrow understanding of liberalism, I argue that to evaluate the moral import of liberalism properly, we need to draw attention to the diversities of liberalism. According to what I will call "historicist liberalism," for example, in understanding other cultures we should try to show sensitivities toward alien political systems and moral values. Second of all, although I appreciate Dowdle's effort to avoid the misinterpretation of non-Western constitutional discourse, I do not agree with …