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The Use Of Legislative History In A System Of Separated Powers, Putting Legislative History To A Vote: A Response To Professor Siegel, Timing And Delegation: A Reply, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

The debate over the legitimacy of judicial use of legislative history has significant legal and political ramifications that have long sparked controversy. As additional commentators join this long-running engagement, the focus of the debate necessarily changes.

In a previous article, John Manning argued that the use of legislative history violates the constitutional rule barring congressional self-delegation. Jonathan Siegel argues here that judicial reliance on legislative history does not implicate that rule, because a statute's legislative history already exists at the time of the statute's passage, and statutory incorporation of preexisting materials operates as an adoption of those materials, not as …

Putting Legislative History To A Vote: A Response To Professor Siegel, John F. Manning

Vanderbilt Law Review

In a previous article, I argued that, properly understood, textualism implements a special form of the nondelegation doctrine, one that prohibits legislative self-delegation.' If the judiciary accepts certain types of legislative history (committee reports and sponsors' statements) as "authoritative" evidence of legislative in- tent in cases of ambiguity, then the particular legislators who write that history (the committees and sponsors) effectively settle statutory meaning for Congress as a whole. Against the background of such a judicially fashioned interpretive practice, when Congress passes a vague or ambiguous statute, it thereby implicitly delegates its law-elaboration authority to legislative agents, who effectively fashion …

Timing And Delegation: A Reply, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

For two authors who come to such different conclusions, Professor Manning and I agree on a good deal. We agree that courts, in considering whether to consult legislative history in the course of statutory construction, must take heed of the special constitutional rule against congressional self-aggrandizement.' Thus, we agree that the Constitution forbids courts to give authoritative weight to post-enactment legislative history, because the effect of such a judicial practice is to permit Congress to delegate a very important power, the power to elaborate the meaning of statutes, to its committees or Members. We also agree, however, that Congress may, …

The Use Of Legislative History In A System Of Separated Powers, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

Legislative history is the ultimate bugaboo of the textualists-those judges and scholars who assert that in statutory interpretation, "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." The textualists have unleashed argument after argument against legislative history. Textualists assert that judicial use of legislative history seeks a collective legislative intent that does not exist and that would not be law if it did exist. They claim that congressional committees deliberately manipulate legislative history in order to influence statutory interpretation. They argue that legislative history is more ambiguous than the statutes it supposedly clarifies, that …

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …

The Reconceptualization Of Legislative History In The Supreme Court, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1995, the Supreme Court began to embrace a approach to interpreting Congressional intent. From that year forward, the Breyers-Stevens model of legislative history, or "institutional legislative history," has seen significant success, emerging in the shadows of the success Justice Scalia's enjoyed while promoting his brand of textualism in the early 1990s. In developing a new way to view Congressional intent, Justices Breyers and Stevens synthesize information gathered from congressional report details, preferably attached to bill drafting choices, thereby renouncing Scalia's reliance on the purposes espoused by the Congressional majority. This new approach, the author contends, rejuvenated the court's approach …