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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Inevitability And Ubiquity Of Cycling In All Feasible Legal Regimes: A Formal Proof, Leo Katz, Alvaro Sandroni Jun 2017

The Inevitability And Ubiquity Of Cycling In All Feasible Legal Regimes: A Formal Proof, Leo Katz, Alvaro Sandroni

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Intransitive choices, or cycling, are generally held to be the mark of irrationality. When a set of rules engenders such choices, it is usually held to be irrational and in need of reform. In this article, we prove a series of theorems, demonstrating that all feasible legal regimes are going to be rife with cycling. Our first result, the legal cycling theorem, shows that unless a legal system meets some extremely restrictive conditions, it will lead to cycling. The discussion that follows, along with our second result, the combination theorem, shows exactly why these conditions are almost impossible to meet ...


An Argument For Incentivizing Voluntary Regulation Of The Fashion And Modeling Industries, Allison Clyne Tschannen Jan 2014

An Argument For Incentivizing Voluntary Regulation Of The Fashion And Modeling Industries, Allison Clyne Tschannen

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Confined To A Narrative: Approaching Rape Shield Laws Through Legal Narratology, Kathryn C. Swiss Jan 2014

Confined To A Narrative: Approaching Rape Shield Laws Through Legal Narratology, Kathryn C. Swiss

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Reasonable Rage: The Problem With Stereotypes In Provocation Cases, Nicole A.K. Matlock Jan 2014

Reasonable Rage: The Problem With Stereotypes In Provocation Cases, Nicole A.K. Matlock

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Putting Progress Back Into Progressive: Reclaiming A Philosophy Of History For The Constitution, David Aram Kaiser Jan 2014

Putting Progress Back Into Progressive: Reclaiming A Philosophy Of History For The Constitution, David Aram Kaiser

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, Paulo Barrozo Jan 2014

Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, Paulo Barrozo

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

Constitutional orders punish—and they punish abundantly. However, analysis of the constitutionality of punishment tends to be reactive, focusing on constitutional violations. Considered in this light, the approach to constitutional punishment rests on conditions of unconstitutionality rather than proactively on the constitutional foundations of punishment as a legitimate liberal-democratic practice. Reactive approaches are predominantly informed by moral theories about the conditions under which punishment is legitimate. In contrast, proactive approaches call for a political theory of punishment as a legitimate practice of polities. This Article integrates the reactive and proactive approaches by bridging the divide between moral and political theories ...


Holding The Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, John L. Warren Iii Jan 2014

Holding The Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, John L. Warren Iii

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Natural Law And Bona Fide Discrimination: The Evolving Understanding Of Sex, Gender, And Transgender Identity In Employment, Kylie Byron Jan 2014

Natural Law And Bona Fide Discrimination: The Evolving Understanding Of Sex, Gender, And Transgender Identity In Employment, Kylie Byron

Washington University Jurisprudence Review

No abstract provided.


Book Review: Julie Dickson And Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Philosophical Foundations Of European Union Law, Arthur Dyevre Mar 2013

Book Review: Julie Dickson And Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Philosophical Foundations Of European Union Law, Arthur Dyevre

Arthur Dyevre

Change in the legal academy tends to be spurred by changes in the legal reality itself rather than by methodological and conceptual innovation emerging from within the discipline. In that sense, legal developments in the real world habitually seem to be ahead of the scholarship. A new phenomenon emerges, which legal scholars then try to apprehend via the established tools and categories of legal thought, soon to discover that these fail to capture the essence of the new reality. The first to experience the changed legal world are usually the scholars who are closest to practice; those who are intimate ...


What Must We Hide: The Ethics Of Privacy And The Ethos Of Disclosure, Anita L. Allen Jan 2012

What Must We Hide: The Ethics Of Privacy And The Ethos Of Disclosure, Anita L. Allen

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


James Wilson And The Scottish Enlightenment, William Ewald Apr 2010

James Wilson And The Scottish Enlightenment, William Ewald

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Rhetoric Of Anti-Relativism In A Culture Of Certainty, Howard Lesnick Jan 2007

The Rhetoric Of Anti-Relativism In A Culture Of Certainty, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Oct 2006

A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Opponents of the death penalty typically base their opposition on contingent features of its administration, arguing that the death penalty is applied discriminatory, that the innocent are sometimes executed, or that there is insufficient evidence of the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy. Implicit in these arguments is the suggestion that if these contingencies did not obtain, serious moral objections to the death penalty would be misplaced. In this Article, Professor Finkelstein argues that there are grounds for opposing the death penalty even in the absence of such contingent factors. She proceeds by arguing that neither of the two prevailing theories ...


The Consciousness Of Religion And The Consciousness Of Law, With Some Implications For Dialogue, Howard Lesnick May 2006

The Consciousness Of Religion And The Consciousness Of Law, With Some Implications For Dialogue, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Law, Ethics And Mystery, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Jan 2005

Law, Ethics And Mystery, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions, Claire O. Finkelstein Jan 2005

What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions, Claire O. Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Ripstein, Rawls, And Responsibility, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2004

Ripstein, Rawls, And Responsibility, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


No Other Gods: Answering The Call Of Faith In The Practice Of Law, Howard Lesnick Jan 2003

No Other Gods: Answering The Call Of Faith In The Practice Of Law, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Harm, History, And Counterfactuals, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2003

Harm, History, And Counterfactuals, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Method And Principle In Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2002

Method And Principle In Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Excuses And Dispositions In Criminal Law, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 2002

Excuses And Dispositions In Criminal Law, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Preempting Oneself: The Right And The Duty To Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing, Leo Katz Jan 1999

Preempting Oneself: The Right And The Duty To Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing, Leo Katz

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Religious Lawyer In A Pluralist Society, Howard Lesnick Jan 1998

The Religious Lawyer In A Pluralist Society, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Hart's Methodological Positivism, Stephen R. Perry Jan 1998

Hart's Methodological Positivism, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Religious Particularity, Religious Metaphor, And Religious Truth: Listening To Tom Shaffer, Howard Lesnick Jan 1995

Religious Particularity, Religious Metaphor, And Religious Truth: Listening To Tom Shaffer, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Wellsprings Of Legal Responses To Inequality: A Perspective On Perspectives, Howard Lesnick Jan 1991

The Wellsprings Of Legal Responses To Inequality: A Perspective On Perspectives, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes On Civic Republicanism, Michael A. Fitts Jan 1988

Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes On Civic Republicanism, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, William Ewald Jan 1988

Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, William Ewald

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Of all the scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, none has garnered greater attention or higher praise than Roberto Unger of Harvard Law School. In this Article, William Ewald argues that Professor Unger's reputation as a brilliant philosopher of law is undeserved. Despite the seeming erudition of his books, Professor Unger's work displays little familiarity with the basic philosophical literature, and the philosophical, legal, and political analysis in those works-in particular, the celebrated critique of liberalism in Knowledge and Politics-is so riddled with logical and historical errors as to be unworthy of serious scholarly attention.


Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics And Kennedy's Form And Substance, William W. Bratton Jan 1985

Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics And Kennedy's Form And Substance, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.