Law Commons^™

Separation Of Powers By Contract: How Collective Bargaining Reshapes Presidential Power, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article demonstrates for the first time how civil servants check and restrain presidential power through collective bargaining. The executive branch is typically depicted as a top-down hierarchy. The President, as chief executive, issues directives with vast implications for federal policy. Usually, the tenured bureaucracy of civil servants below him follow these directives. Occasionally, when the President’s policies appear corrupt or ill-advised, bureaucrats may illicitly “resist” them. This presumed top-down structure shapes many influential critiques of the modern administrative state. Proponents of a strong President decry civil servants as an unelected “deep state” usurping popular will. Skeptics of presidential power …

Rediscovering The Journal Clause: The Lost History Of Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each house of Congress keep a Journal of its proceedings. Contemporary observers have largely ignored this provision, treating it as a vestigial record-keeping requirement with little significance for modern law. This dismissive attitude is misguided. Historically, legislative Journals were one of the primary mechanisms by which Parliament, and later Congress, made and interpreted constitutional law. Journals are the official histories of legislatures’ activity. They record what legislatures do as institutions—what powers they exercise, what procedures they use, and what actions by the coordinate branches they protest or resist. In …

The Attorney General's Forgotten Role As Legal Advisor To The Legislature: A Comment On Schmidt V Canada (Attorney General), Andrew Martin

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

In Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), the Federal Court of Appeal interpreted a series of provisions requiring the Minister of Justice to inform the House of Commons if government bills or proposed regulations are “inconsistent with” the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Federal Court of Appeal, like the Federal Court below, held that these provisions are triggered only where there is no credible argument for consistency. In doing so, both Courts relied, in part, on a separation of powers argument. They stated that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General is not …

Victory Without Success? – The Guantanamo Litigation, Permanent Preventive Detention, And Resisting Injustice, Jules Lobel

Articles

When the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) brought the first habeas cases challenging the Executive’s right to detain prisoners in a law free zone at Guantanamo in 2002, almost no legal commentator gave the plaintiffs much chance of succeeding. Yet, two years later in 2004, after losing in both the District Court and Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush handed CCR a resounding victory. Four years later, the Supreme Court again ruled in CCR’s favor in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush, holding that the detainees had a constitutional right to habeas and declaring the Congressional …

Congress In Court, Amanda Frost

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Congress rarely participates in litigation about the meaning of federal law. By contrast, the executive branch joins in federal litigation on a regular basis as either a party or amicus curiae. Congress simply assumes that the president’s lawyers adequately represent its interests save in those rare instances when the two branches have a direct conflict. This Article questions that assumption.

The federal judiciary’s approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation diminishes Congress’s influence, often to the benefit of the executive branch. The rise of textualism, the canon of constitutional avoidance, the reliance on Chevron deference, and the courts’ reluctance to second-guess …

Deconstructing Nondelegation, Cynthia R. Farina

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Essay (part of the panel on "The Administrative State and the Constitution" at the 2009 Federalist Society Student Symposium) suggests that the persistence of debates over delegation to agencies cannot persuasively be explained as a determination finally to get constitutional law “right,” for nondelegation doctrine—at least as traditionally stated—does not rest on a particularly sound legal foundation. Rather, these debates continue because nondelegation provides a vehicle for pursuing a number of different concerns about the modern regulatory state. Whether or not one shares these concerns, they are not trivial, and we should voice and engage them directly rather than …

What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

In this article, the author argues that the concept of "judicial independence" has served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usually finds in public policy debates about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence, the author attributes much of …

The War On Terrorism And Civil Liberties, Jules Lobel

Articles

Throughout American history, we have grappled with the problem of balancing liberty versus security in times of war or national emergency. Our history is littered with sordid examples of the Constitution's silence during war or perceived national emergency. The Bush Administration’s War on Terror has once again forced a reckoning requiring Americans to balance liberty and national security in wartime. President Bush has stated, "[w]e believe in democracy and rule of law and the Constitution. But we're under attack.” President Bush, Attorney General Ashcroft and other governmental leaders have argued that in war, "the Constitution does not give foreign enemies …

The Unitary Executive During The First Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features …

Section 9: The Court And Politics, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Ways To Think About The Unitary Executive: A Comment On Approaches To Government Structure, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Retaining The Rule Of Law In A Chevron World, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.