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Articles 31 - 52 of 52
Full-Text Articles in Law
Living Originalism, Peter J. Smith, Thomas Colby
Living Originalism, Peter J. Smith, Thomas Colby
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Originalists routinely argue that originalism is the only coherent and legitimate theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article endeavors to undermine those claims by demonstrating that, despite the suggestion of originalist rhetoric, originalism is not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a disparate collection of distinct constitutional theories that share little more than a misleading reliance on a common label. Originalists generally agree only on certain very broad precepts that serve as the fundamental underlying principles of constitutional interpretation: specifically, that the “writtenness” of the Constitution necessitates a fixed constitutional meaning, and that courts that see …
It Depends, Gary S. Lawson
It Depends, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Peter Strauss stated at the outset of this Symposium that the participants were chosen in part for the likelihood that they would generate “intelligent disagreement.” By that standard, I may have been a poor choice--and if that is the case, I will leave it to the reader to determine whether it is a function of the first or second term in the quoted phrase. At first glance, it looks as though I sharply disagree with Rick Pildes and Harold Bruff about whether the PCAOB's members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent …
Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing And The Petition Clause, Karl S. Coplan
Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing And The Petition Clause, Karl S. Coplan
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
In the 1992 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife decision, Justice Scalia declared that business interests subject to regulation had automatic standing to challenge regulations in court, but that where “the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” This article explores the impact this differential standard for court access has on ideologically-motivated public interest plaintiffs, and suggest heightened scrutiny of standing rules under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment based on the viewpoint differential effect of current standing doctrine. This …
Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney
Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked post-abortion regret to justify a ban on a particular abortion procedure. The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident." That such observations could drive critical legal determinations was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously unidentified norm permeating constitutional jurisprudence: reliance on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about the emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal to …
Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, And Imagination In Constitutional Culture, Doni Gewirtzman
Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, And Imagination In Constitutional Culture, Doni Gewirtzman
Articles & Chapters
Traditionally, scholars and judges have treated emotion as a destructive force within constitutional culture. This Article uses recent developments in social psychology, neurobiology, and political psychology to challenge this dominant account and reposition emotion as central to our collective constitutional endeavor. It argues that emotion is critical to commitment and imagination, two features of human behavior that are essential to constitutional legitimacy and innovation. Further, emotions shape our perceptions and preferences about constitutional values through their impact on attitude development and moral decision-making. Finally, our increased understanding of emotion's impact on human behavior has the potential to alter the way …
Who's Afraid Of Polygamy? Exploring The Boundaries Of Family, Equality And Custom In South Africa, Penelope Andrews
Who's Afraid Of Polygamy? Exploring The Boundaries Of Family, Equality And Custom In South Africa, Penelope Andrews
Articles & Chapters
South Africa's post-apartheid constitution has been widely admired and constantly referenced by international scholars, and especially international human rights scholars, for its comprehensive embrace of gender equality. But the commitment to gender equality has been tested by other liberatory discourses, including African nationalism and cultural and religious autonomy. This Article examines the evolution of South African legislation and constitutional jurisprudence in the face of competing imperatives, for example, between equality, legal pluralism, customary law/religious law, and the recognition of polygamy. In particular, it focuses on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, a statute that purports to regulate customary marriages, including …
On The Limits Of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana And The States' Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal Crime, Robert A. Mikos
On The Limits Of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana And The States' Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal Crime, Robert A. Mikos
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Using the conflict over medical marijuana as a timely case study, this Article explores the overlooked and underappreciated power of states to legalize conduct Congress bans. Though Congress has banned marijuana outright, and though that ban has survived constitutional scrutiny, state laws legalizing medical use of marijuana constitute the de facto governing law in thirteen states. This Article argues that these state laws and (most) related regulations have not been, and, more interestingly, cannot be preempted by Congress, given constraints imposed on Congress's preemption power by the anti-commandeering rule, properly understood. Just as importantly, these state laws matter, in a …
Rights, Remedies And Facial Challenges, Maya Manian
Rights, Remedies And Facial Challenges, Maya Manian
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
In a few short years, the Roberts Court has managed to severely restrict the use of facial challenges across substantive areas of constitutional law. Caitlin Borgmann's article, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through Facial Challenges, provides a compelling analysis of the vexing distinction between as applied and facial challenges in constitutional litigation and the impact that limiting facial challenges has on constitutional rights. Borgmann argues that facial challenges are necessary to keep legislatures in check, particularly when legislatures "deliberately or recklessly infringe individual rights" of those who lack political power. Facial challenges are needed in this context not only to protect …
Heller High Water? The Future Of Originalism, Jamal Greene
Heller High Water? The Future Of Originalism, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Has originalism won? It's easy to think so, judging from some of the reaction to the Supreme Court's recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. The Heller Court held that the District of Columbia could neither ban possession of handguns nor require that all other firearms be either unloaded and disassembled or guarded by a trigger lock. In finding for the first time in the Court's history that a gun control law violated the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia's opinion for the 5-4 majority appeared to be a sterling exemplar of originalism, the method of constitutional interpretation that he …
Saving Law Reviews From Political Scientists: A Defense Of Lawyers, Law Professors, And Law Reviews, Benjamin H. Barton
Saving Law Reviews From Political Scientists: A Defense Of Lawyers, Law Professors, And Law Reviews, Benjamin H. Barton
Scholarly Works
This essay reviews Robert J. Spitzer, Saving the Constitution from Lawyers: How Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning, and argues that it fails on two fronts. First, I offer a defense of lawyers, law professors, and law reviews. Second, I show that Spitzer's own book proves that peer-reviewed political science scholarship suffers from at least as many faults and foibles as law review scholarship.
For example, in each of his three examples of wayward theorizing Spitzer insists that his reading of the Constitution and its history is so clearly correct that his opponents' scholarship is not only wrong …
The Constitutionality Of Breed Discriminatory Legislation: A Summary, Joan E. Schaffner
The Constitutionality Of Breed Discriminatory Legislation: A Summary, Joan E. Schaffner
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This chapter focuses on Toledo v. Tellings, an Ohio case dealing with breed-specific legislation that restricted a Toledo resident to owning one “vicious” dog, defined purely by breed as a pit bull. This case implicated numerous constitutional issues, including vagueness, procedural due process, equal protection, substantive due process, takings, and privileges and immunities. Although the Ohio Sixth Appellate District struck down the breed-specific legislation, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, and I find this reversal at odds with the constitutional issues at play.
Cross-Examining Film, Jessica Silbey
Cross-Examining Film, Jessica Silbey
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Harris holds that a Georgia police officer did not violate a fleeing suspect's Fourth Amendment rights when he caused the suspect's car to crash. The court's decision relies almost entirely on the filmed version of the high-speed police chase taken from a "dash-cam," a video camera mounted on the dashboard of the pursuing police cruiser. The Supreme Court said that in light of the contrary stories told by the opposing parties to the lawsuit, the only story to be believed was that told by the video. In Scott v. Harris, the court fell …
Unshackling Speech (Book Review), David L. Lange
Unshackling Speech (Book Review), David L. Lange
Faculty Scholarship
Reviewing, Brian C. Anderson and Adam D. Thierer, A Manifesto for Media Freedom (2008))
Religion In The Workplace: A Report On The Layers Of Relevant Law In The United States, William W. Van Alstyne
Religion In The Workplace: A Report On The Layers Of Relevant Law In The United States, William W. Van Alstyne
Faculty Scholarship
This article reports on the thick layers of law applicable to claims of religious exception to public and private employment workplaces in the United States. It reviews the Supreme Court's First and Fourteenth Amendment salient holdings, distinguishing public sector (government) workplaces, and the extent to which legislative bodies may and may not oblige private employers to "accommodate" religiously-asserted requirements. It also provides exhaustive footnote analyses of all major federal statutes (plus some representative state and local law variations) pertinent to the topic. Its principal conclusions are these: In the currently prevailing view of the U.S. Supreme Court, neither public nor …
Property And Speech In ‘Summum’, Joseph Blocher
Property And Speech In ‘Summum’, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Guns As Smut: Defending The Home-Bound Second Amendment, Darrell A. H. Miller
Guns As Smut: Defending The Home-Bound Second Amendment, Darrell A. H. Miller
Faculty Scholarship
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal, individual right to keep and bear arms. But the Court left lower courts and legislatures adrift on the fundamental question of scope. While the Court stated in dicta that some regulation may survive constitutional scrutiny, it left the precise contours of the right, and even the method by which to determine those contours, for 'future evaluation."
This Article offers a provocative proposal for tackling the issue of Second Amendment scope, one tucked in many dresser drawers across the nation: Treat the Second Amendment …
‘The Federalist’ Abroad In The World, Donald L. Horowitz
‘The Federalist’ Abroad In The World, Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
This paper traces the influence of The Federalist Papers on five continents. From 1787 to roughly 1850, The Federalist was widely read and highly influential, especially in Europe and Latin America. Federalist justifications for federalism as a solution to the problem of creating a continental republic or to provincial rivalries were widely accepted. So, too, was the presidency, at least in Latin America, and that region adopted judicial review later in the nineteenth century. Presidentialism and judicial review fared less well in Western Europe. Following World War II, judicial review slowly became part of the standard equipment of new and …
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, Jedediah Purdy
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, Jedediah Purdy
Faculty Scholarship
This Article adds a new dimension to the most important and influential strand of recent constitutional theory: popular or democratic constitutionalism, the investigation into how the U.S. Constitution is interpreted (1) as a set of defining national commitments and practices, not necessarily anchored in the text of the document, and (2) by citizens and elected politicians outside the judiciary. Wide-ranging and groundbreaking scholarship in this area has neglected the role of the President as a popular constitutional interpreter, articulating and revising normative accounts of the nation that interact dynamically with citizens’ constitutional understandings. This Article sets out a “grammar” of …
The Missing Jurisprudence Of The Legislated Constitution, Robin West
The Missing Jurisprudence Of The Legislated Constitution, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Does the fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause — the promise that "no state shall deny equal protection of the laws" — have any relevance to the progressive project of reducing economic inequality in various spheres of life or, more modestly, of ameliorating the multiple vulnerabilities of this country's poor people? The short answer, I believe, is, it depends. It will depend, in 2020, just as it depends now, on what we mean by the Constitution we are expounding: the Constitution as read and interpreted by courts — the adjudicated Constitution — or what I propose to call the …
Is Law? Constitutional Crisis And Existential Anxiety, Alice G. Ristroph
Is Law? Constitutional Crisis And Existential Anxiety, Alice G. Ristroph
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In the recurring discussions of constitutional crises, one may find three forms of existential anxiety. The first, and most fleeting, is an anxiety about the continued existence of the nation. A second form of anxiety—to my mind, the most interesting form—is an anxiety about the possibility of the rule of law itself. Third, and most solipsistically, references to crisis in constitutional law scholarship could be the product of a kind of professional anxiety in the legal academy. We may be asking ourselves, “Constitutional theory: what is it good for?” and worrying that the answer is, “Absolutely nothing.” And yet, I …
Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett
Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett
Journal Articles
At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …
Constitutional Limits On Punitive Damages Awards: An Analysis Of Supreme Court Precedent, Dorothy S. Lund
Constitutional Limits On Punitive Damages Awards: An Analysis Of Supreme Court Precedent, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has formulated new constitutional principles to constrain punitive damages awards imposed by state courts, invoking its authority under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This intervention has been controversial from the start, generating dissents from several Justices asserting that the actions of the Court are unwarranted and amount to unjustified judicial activism. Over the ensuing years lower courts and commentators have criticized the Court’s prescription of procedural and substantive limitations, finding them to be vague and unnecessarily restrictive of state common law prerogatives. Some observers with an economic orientation have …