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The Vanishing Common Law Judge, Neal Devins, David Klein
The Vanishing Common Law Judge, Neal Devins, David Klein
Neal E. Devins
The common law style of judging appears to be on its way out. Trial courts rarely shape legal policymaking by asserting decisional autonomy through distinguishing, limiting, or criticizing higher court precedent. In an earlier study, we demonstrated the reluctance of lower court judges to assert decisional autonomy by invoking the holding–dicta dichotomy. In this Article, we make use of original empirical research to study the level of deference U.S. district court judges exhibit toward higher courts and whether the level of deference has changed over time. Our analysis of citation behavior over an eighty-year period reveals a dramatic shift in …
Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, And Fifty Approaches To The Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, And Fifty Approaches To The Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Neal E. Devins
Whether a state attorney general has a duty to defend the validity of state law is a complicated question, one that cannot be decided by reference either to the oath state officers must take to support the federal Constitution or the supremacy of federal law. Instead, whether a state attorney general must defend state law turns on her own state’s laws. Each state has its own constitution, statutes, bar rules, and traditions, and not surprisingly, the duties of attorneys general vary across the states. To simplify somewhat, we believe that there are three types of duties. One set of attorneys …
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …