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The Innocence Effect, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor
The Innocence Effect, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor
Oren Gazal-Ayal
Nearly all felony convictions—about 95%—follow guilty pleas, suggesting plea offers are very attractive compared to trials. Many scholars, in fact, argue plea bargains are too attractive and should be curtailed because they facilitate the wrongful conviction of innocents. Others contend plea offers only benefit innocent defendants, providing an alternative to the risk of a much harsher sentence at trial they may wish to avoid. Both detractors and supporters thus believe plea bargains often lead innocents to plead guilty. The two camps in the debate, moreover, also share the view that defendants’ culpability matters little for the rate of plea bargaining, …
Fairness And The Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia
Fairness And The Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia
Oren Gazal-Ayal
In contrast with the typical assumption in plea bargaining law and economics, we show defendants may reject plea offers based on fairness considerations. Specifically, offers where the sanction clearly appears excessive for the crime ("substantively unfair") and offers that appear inferior to those received by others in similar cases ("comparatively unfair") diminish defendants' wiliingness to accept plea offers (WTAP). Part 1 analyzes real-world data in Study 1 and reviews early experiments, all of which sugget substantive fairness impacts WTAP but do not control for important confounds. Part 2 therefore presents Studies 2-4 that confirm the independent impact of substantive fairness. …
Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal
Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal
Oren Gazal-Ayal
The influence of the plea bargaining system on innocent defendants is fiercely debated. Many scholars call for a ban on plea bargaining, arguing that the practice coerces innocent defendants to plead guilty. Proponents of plea bargaining respond that even an innocent defendant is better off when he choose to plea bargain in order to assure a lenient result, if he concludes that the risk of wrongful trial conviction is too high. They claim that since plea bargaining is only an option, it cannot harm the defendant whether he is guilty or innocent. This paper argues that the both supporters and …
Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal
Plea Bargains Only For The Guilty, Oren Bar-Gill, Oren Gazal
Oren Gazal-Ayal
A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty. This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore be forced to – (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction …