Law Commons^™

Originalism, Official History, And Perspectives Versus Methodologies, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper addresses a well-worn topic: originalism, the theory that judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the intent of its framers. I am interested in the real-world effects of originalism. The primary effect advanced by originalists is the tendency of the approach to constrain the discretion of judges. However, another effect of originalism that I identify is the creation of official histories, a practice that imposes a hidden tax on society. Another question I consider is whether originalism should be considered a methodology of analyzing the law or a perspective on the law. I argue that …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).

This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …

The Constitution, The Common Good, And The Ambition Of Adrian Vermeule, Sotirios Barber, Stephen Macedo, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Public trust in the U.S. government has declined steadily over the last sixty years, from 73% in 1958 to 17% in 2018 (Pew 12/9/20). Public support for the U.S. Constitution has remained higher. When support for the government dipped to an all-time low of 15% in 2010, support for the Constitution stood at 74%. But the gap has narrowed. From 2010 to 2017 support for the Constitution fell from 74% to around 50%—a drop of 24 points in seven years (AP/NCC 8/12; Rasmussen 2017). These figures suggest that if Americans continue to believe that their government isn’t working, they’ll eventually …

Legacies Of Pragmatism, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Pragmatism has triumphed in the law by becoming all things to all people—or has it? This essay, prepared for a symposium at Drake University Law School's Constitutional Law Center, examines the future of pragmatism in constitutional thought. First, I revisit the work of William James to recover the ideal disposition of a pragmatist decision maker. Second, I analyze pragmatism's impact on constitutional theory from Richard Posner to Cass Sunstein, from Philip Bobbitt to Willy Forbath and Joey Fishkin. I show that pragmatism lives on in constitutional theories that don't self-consciously characterize themselves in such terms. I also contend that pragmatism …

Response To Bruce Frohnen’S Review Of Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings And Against Originalisms, James E. Fleming, Bruce P. Frohnen

Faculty Scholarship

It is a privilege to participate in this exchange with Bruce Frohnen concerning our books. In my Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I observe that in recent years, many have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. I reject all forms of originalism and defend a moral reading of the United States Constitution. Such a conception views the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices. It sees interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely historical research to …

The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In my book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 1 I reject originalisms—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the United States Constitution, or a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively …

Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Some of my earliest and fondest memories regarding constitutional theory involve Mike McConnell. He was a participant at the very first Federalist Society conference in 1982, at a time when the entire universe of conservative constitutional theorists fit comfortably in the front of one classroom. More importantly, at another Federalist Society conference in 1987, he gave a speech on constitutional interpretation that, unbeknownst to him, profoundly shaped my entire intellectual approach to the field by emphasizing the obvious but oftoverlooked point that different kinds of documents call for different kinds of interpretative methods.1 In 2015, it is more than an …

Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2013), Richard Epstein says that he "incorporates but goes beyond" originalist theory by calling for adjudication "in sync with" classical liberal theory political theory, which Professor Epstein claims underlies the Constitution. Without in any way detracting from the numerous virtues of this book, I argue that this is primarily a work of constitutional construction rather than constitutional interpretation. From the standpoint of interpretation, the background rules that best supplement the constitutional text are found in eighteenth-century fiduciary law rather than in classical liberal political theory, though the latter is …

Critical Reflections On Seidman's On Constitutional Disobedience, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium contribution critically examines Louis Seidman’s book "Constitutional Disobedience" (2012). Seidman questions whether American constitutionalism really has the positive values commonly attributed to it. He suggests that citizens and legislators should shift away from claims that the Constitution requires or forbids certain governmental choices and toward more straightforward, “all-things-considered” political debate about “how to solve real, modern problems” and “about what will produce the best country.” I argue against Seidman's view that straightforward political talk will be less polarizing and divisive than constitution-invoking discussion. Seidman, I think, might romanticize ordinary political discussion in somewhat the same way that orthodox …

Constitutional And Religious Redemption: Assessing Jack Balkin's Call For A 'Constitutional Project’, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

I begin with a disclaimer: I am not a constitutional theorist. I haven’t even played one on TV. But according to Professor Jack Balkin’s ambitious new book Living Originalism, that should not stop me from engaging in what he calls “the constitutional project,” in which I, along with others, attempt to interpret – indeed, to redeem – the U.S. constitution.1 Living Originalism pairs two intriguing ideas: a “constitutional project” and “constitutional redemption.” I am excited by the notion of a project, and of a constitutional project in particular. In my work for at least a decade I have used the …

Why The 'Originalism' In 'Living Originalism'?, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Jack Balkin’s "Living Originalism" (2011), together with the companion volume "Constitutional Redemption," is an extraordinary achievement that secures his position in the front rank of American constitutional theorists. In those works, Balkin develops a constitutional theory he identifies alternatively as “living originalism” and as “framework originalism.” In this latter expression, Balkin distinguishes two senses of the term “framework.” In the first sense of “framework,” the Constitution establishes a framework for governance and politics. The second sense of “framework” derives from the first. Governance, Balkin argues, involves state-building and constitutional construction by the political branches, not just by the courts. Social …

Taking Responsibilities As Well As Rights Seriously, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In his first book, Ronald Dworkin famously called for “taking rights seriously” by treating them as “trumps” over considerations of utility or the general welfare.1 Taking Rights Seriously (along with other works) provoked calls for taking responsibilities as well as (or instead of) rights seriously, or for engaging in “responsibility talk,” not just “rights talk.”2 In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin himself got on the responsibility bandwagon in justifying the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die.3 He countenanced that government may encourage women to take the decision whether to have an abortion responsibly, so long as it does not …

Constitutional Theory And The Future Of The Unitary Executive, Sotirios Barber, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency, Mark Tushnet distinguishes two voices: "alarmists who see in every action taken by the Bush [A]dministration a portent of gross restrictions on the civil liberties of all Americans, and administration shills who see in those actions entirely reasonable, perhaps even too moderate, accommodations of civil liberties to the new realities of national security."1 Tushnet's volume contains essays, including one by us,2 which he judges to lie "beyond alarmism and complacency" (or perhaps between alarmism and complacency). But critics of the Bush Administration's theory of the unitary executive may be alarmed by …

The Odyssey Of Cass Sunstein, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I am delighted to participate in this symposium honoring and criticizing the scholarship of Cass Sunstein. Let me begin by stating something so obvious that we typically don't say it: Cass is the most remarkably thoughtful, constructive, and productive scholar of his (and my) generation, the generation of scholars born around the time that Brown v. Board of Education1 was decided. No one has addressed a wider range of important subjects or made a more substantial contribution to our understanding of law. I have been fruitfully engaging with his scholarship from my first article 2 to my two recent books.3 …

The Incredible Shrinking Constitutional Theory: From The Partial Constitution To The Minimal Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Cass Sunstein and I have written fundamentally different books. My Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy' puts forward a liberal Constitution-perfecting theory, one that aspires to interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. Sunstein's Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America2 advances a minimalist critique of radical conservative constitutional theories of "fundamentalism" that call for restoring the "Constitution in exile."

The Balkanization Of Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Are we all originalists now? If anything would prompt that question, it would be Ronald Dworkin and Jack Balkin dressing up their theories in the garb of originalism (or, at any rate, being interpreted as originalists). For they are exemplars of two bete noires of originalism as conventionally understood: namely, the moral reading of the Constitution, and pragmatic, living constitutionalism, respectively.' Yet in recent years Dworkin has been interpreted as an abstract originalist2 and Balkin has now embraced the method of text and principle, which he presents as a form of abstract originalism.'

Securing Deliberative Democracy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

The brochure for the conference frames the questions for our panel on The Constitutional Essentials of Political Liberalism as "What are the implications of Rawls's conceptions of justice as fairness and political liberalism for constitutional theory? Might his account of constitutional essentials provide a useful guiding framework for conceiving the scheme of basic liberties embodied in the American Constitution? How thin are the commitments of our Constitution as compared with our richer commitments to constitutional justice and political justice? What are the implications of Rawls's work for theory of judicial review and for enforcement of constitutional rights and obligations outside …

The Missing Selves In Constitutional Self-Government, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Both Christopher Eisgruber and Jed Rubenfeld have written important books developing sophisticated theories of constitutional self-government. Eisgruber's Constitutional Self-Government' and Rubenfeld's Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional SelfGovernment2 join issue in significant ways, and therefore a dialogue concerning them should prove illuminating. Rubenfeld says his book and Eisgruber's book are somewhat similar, but very different.' Eisgruber says his book and Rubenfeld's book are fairly similar, yet also somewhat different-and where they differ, they sometimes complement one another, or perhaps supply the deficiencies in the other.4 I say the books are very similar-more similar than either recognizes or concedes-and that …

Fidelity To Natural Law And Natural Rights In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

It is an honor and a pleasure to comment on Professor Robert P. George's elegant and provocative paper.' For one thing, he is a leading proponent of reviving the natural law tradition in political, legal, and constitutional theory.2 For another, he was a reader of my Ph.D. dissertation in constitutional theory at Princeton University over a decade ago. I am happy to have the chance to reciprocate by reading a work of his and providing a critique of it. Fortunately, I learned at Princeton that vigorous criticism and disagreement are fully compatible with friendship and respect.

The Parsimony Of Libertarianism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I want to begin by congratulating Randy Barnett on writing The Structure of Liberty,' one of the most radical and provocative works of political and legal theory that I have ever read. I consider myself to be a liberal who prizes liberty. Barnett claims to provide an account of the structure of liberty along with "[t]he liberal conception of justice" and the rule of law.2 His is a radical libertarian account centrally concerned with protecting the fundamental natural rights of property, first possession, freedom of contract, and self-defense. In Barnett's world, the fabled libertarian night-watchman state has been downsized and …

Fidelity, Basic Liberties, And The Specter Of Lochner, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I want to begin by frankly acknowledging that the group of scholars participating in the conference is more conservative than the crowd with whom I usually travel. Accordingly, at the outset, I want to say something ingratiating. Then, I will say something provocative. Here is the ingratiating part: economic liberties and property rights, like personal liberties, are fundamental rights secured by our Constitution. In fact, economic liberties and property rights are so fundamental in our constitutional scheme, and so sacred in our constitutional culture, that there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive judicial protection of them. Rather, such …

Toward A Formative Project Of Securing Freedom And Equality, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium offers an occasion to pursue two important tasks: (1) identifying normative and constitutional foundations for an affimnative governmental responsibility to engage in a "formative project" that would foster persons' capacities for democratic and personal self-government;' and (2) exploring the mix of normative and empirical inquiries necessary to shape the proper goals and parameters of such a project. These tasks are relevant to my larger project of attempting to develop a synthetic, or feminist and liberal, normative account of rights, responsibilities, and governmental promotion of good, self-governing lives.2 That account argues for governmental responsibility to foster the preconditions for …

Securing Deliberative Autonomy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, Professor Fleming proposes to tether the right of autonomy by grounding it within a constitutional constructivism, a guidingframeworkfor constitutional theory with two fundamental themes: deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. He advances deliberative autonomy as a unifying theme that shows the coherence and structure of certain substantive liberties on a list of familiar "unenumerated" fundamental rights (commonly classed under privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process). The bedrock structure of deliberative autonomy secures basic liberties that are significant preconditions for persons' ability to deliberate about and make certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life. As …

We The Exceptional American People, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I. INTRODUCTION: "AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM" There is an academic movement afoot-one with a long historical pedigree-to attribute the vitality of the American constitutional order to "American exceptionalism." The most prominent representative of this school of thought is Bruce Ackerman, whose We the People opens with a jeremiad against the "Europeanization" of American constitutional theory and urges us as Americans to "look inward" to rediscover our distinctive patterns, practices, and ideals.2 He maps the terrain of theory as being divided into monists ("Anglophiles"), rights foundationalists ("Germanophiles"), and dualists (red-blooded Americans).3 Only dualists have the "strength" to declare our American independence from British …

Constructing The Substantive Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I. Introduction A. The Flights from Substance in Constitutional Theory A specter is haunting constitutional theory-the specter of Lochner v. New York.' In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court gave heightened judicial protection to substantive economic liberties through the Due Process Clauses.2 In 1937, during the constitutional revolution wrought by the New Deal, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish3 officially repudiated the Lochner era, marking the first death of substantive due process.4 Nevertheless, the ghost of Lochner has perturbed constitutional theory ever since, manifesting itself in charges that judges are "Lochnering" by imposing their own substantive fundamental values in the guise …

Thayer Versus Marshall, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Nagel's intriguing paper1 suggests that James Bradley Thayer's clear error rule of constitutional adjudication 2 is not an effective vehicle for controlling, and indeed may even exacerbate, the tendency toward invective that often characterizes modem court decisions and legal arguments. Professor Nagel is too charitable. To the extent that Thayer's article has had an influence on either the style or substance of modem constitutional law, that influence has been even more pernicious than Professor Nagel lets on. The source of that problem, however, is less the clear error rule itself than the premises that generate and, in Thayer's view, …

Administrative Failure And Local Democracy: The Politics Of Deshaney, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay is an effort to construct a normative basis for a constitutional theory to resist the Supreme Court's recent decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.¹ In DeShaney, the Court decided that a local social service worker's failure to prevent child abuse did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment even though the social worker "had reason to believe" the abuse was occurring. ² Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court held that government inaction cannot violate due process unless the state has custody of the victim, ³ thus settling a controversial …

Review Of Red, White, And Blue: A Critical Analysis Of Constitutional Law By Mark Tushnet, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Mark Tushnet's new book offers no such counsel. Mainly a critique of interpretative theories, its conclusions are profoundly skeptical. Tushnet's central claim is that judicial review and constitutional theory cannot possibly perform their assigned functions, and that liberalism is to blame. This review will focus on those facets of the book.

A Preface To Constitutional Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

We have a plethora of theories about judicial review, including theories about theories, but their foundations require stricter scrutiny. This Essay presents some aspects of the problem through an examination of two important and familiar ideas about judicial review.

The controversy over "noninterpretive" review concerns the propriety of courts' deciding constitutional cases by using extraconstitutional norms. But the theoretical framework has not been well developed and appears to raise the wrong questions about judicial review. Thayer's doctrine of extreme judicial deference to the legislature has received much attention, but his reasoning has been given less careful notice. Thayer's rule rests …