Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporate Claims Against Director For Paying Bribes On Company's Behalf: Ho Kang Peng V Scintronix (Formerly Ttl Holdings), Wai Yee Wan Nov 2014

Corporate Claims Against Director For Paying Bribes On Company's Behalf: Ho Kang Peng V Scintronix (Formerly Ttl Holdings), Wai Yee Wan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Can a company recover the value of the bribe from a director who has paid the bribe, on behalf of the company, to a third party to secure certain benefits for the company, and where it is not alleged that the director had personally benefitted from the bribe? This question raises several complex issues relating to directors’ standard of care, corporate authorisation and corporate illegality, which were considered by the recent decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp (formerly known as TTL Holdings).


Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2014

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …


The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing Aug 2010

The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing

John Lessing

Good corporate governance requires a range of regulatory checks and balances - or mechanisms - to be effective. If one mechanism fails, the system will fail like a chain with a weak link. This article provides an overview and brief explanation of the main checks and balances a country needs to have a good corporate governance system. It is of particular relevance to countries with transition economies. However, it is also important in developed countries as recent corporate collapses and failures in the financial system have illustrated.