Law Commons^™

State Capture, Corporate Ownership Structure, And Institutional Reform Issues In Ethiopia- Abstract.Docx, Seid Y. Hassan

Seid Hassan

The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson

William J. Magnuson

This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …

Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson

William J. Magnuson

The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the …

It's Tax Not Trade (Stupid), Edward J. Mccaffery

Edward J McCaffery

Globalization, trade and other free market policies increase wealth. But the gains from trade are not being evenly spread among all citizens. People and politicians rage against foreigners. But it is the United States tax system, not trade, that ought to change, and wealthy Americans, not workers world-wide, who should be sharing the wealth. A nd it is the form of tax, not just its rate structure, that must reform, so that capital at last bears a meaningful share of the burden.

Unilateral Corporate Regulation, William Magnuson

William J. Magnuson

Corporations today wield unprecedented power in politics and society, and they have a tremendous effect on human welfare around the globe. At the same time, they are increasingly difficult to regulate. Corporations are savvy and mobile, and they can relocate to avoid burdensome domestic regulation with surprising ease. The agility of corporations creates a dilemma for government decisionmakers seeking to balance the need to attract the wealth that corporations create with the desire to pursue other policy priorities. One potential approach that governments have used to address this dilemma is international cooperation, and a growing number of scholars have argued …

On The Continuing Misuse Of Event Studies: The Example Of Bessen And Meurer, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.

Glynn Lunney

No abstract provided.

Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …

The Role Of Groups In Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, In Three Parts, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Legal scholars, as well as economists, have focused limited attention on the role of coordinated groups of market participants - committees, clubs, associations, and the like - in social ordering generally and in the evolution of norms particularly. One might trace this neglect to some presumptive orientation to state actors (expressive law) and autonomous individuals (norm entrepreneurs) as the sole parties of interest in social change. Yet, alternative stories of social ordering and norm change might also be told. Dramatic recent changes in the contracting practices of the sovereign debt markets offer one such story.

Using the latter by way …

The Dialectical Regulation Of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic Governance In Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

In recent years, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act - first adopted more than sixty years ago to increase shareholder participation in corporate governance - has been the subject of a flurry of litigation, scholarly analysis, and SEC rulemaking. Most recently, following several years of debate, the SEC issued a significant clarification of the rule, reversing the Second Circuit's hotly contested interpretation of it in AFSCME v. AIG. For the most part, the debates surrounding Rule 14a-8 - including in the latter case - have focused on the scope of the rule's exceptions. This paper, selected for reprinting in …

The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …

Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Securities markets are commonly assumed to spring forth at the intersection of an adequate supply of, and a healthy demand for, investment capital. In recent years, however, seemingly failed market transitions - the failure of new markets to emerge and of existing markets to evolve - have called this assumption into question. From the developed economies of Germany and Japan to the developing countries of central and eastern Europe, securities markets have exhibited some inability to take root. The failure of U.S. securities markets, and particularly the New York Stock Exchange, to make greater use of computerized trading, communications, and …

From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …

Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

While theories of regulation abound, woefully inadequate attention has been given to growing patterns of "intersystemic" and "dialectical" regulation in the world today. In this rapidly expanding universe of interactions, independent regulatory agencies, born of autonomous jurisdictions, nonetheless face a combination of jurisdictional overlap with, and regulatory dependence on, one another. Here, the cross-jurisdictional interaction of regulators is no longer the voluntary interaction embraced by transnationalists; it is, instead, an unavoidable reality of acknowledgement and engagement, potentially culminating in the integration of discrete sets of regulatory rules into a collective whole.

Such patterns of regulatory engagement are increasingly evident, across …

Between Mandate And Market: Contract Transition In The Shadow Of The International Order, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Boilerplate in sovereign debt contracts issued in the United States has long dictated the unanimous consent of bondholders to any debt restructuring. This requirement persisted for decades, notwithstanding wide consensus that such unanimous action provisions increased transaction costs, produced inefficient delays in debt restructuring, enhanced the moral hazards of the sovereign debt market, and otherwise encouraged collective action failures. Yet the sovereign debt markets has recently made an about-face, replacing the unanimity requirement for debt restructuring with a less demanding provision for collective, or majority, action by creditors. Completed over the course of just a few months in 2003, this …

Reforming The Unbargained Contract: Avoiding Bondholder Claims For Surprise Par Calls, Robert S. Blanc, Randy D. Gordon

Randy D. Gordon

Until the last couple of decades, interest rates remained relatively stable, thus providing little incentive for corporate borrowers to seek novel ways of redeeming purportedly non-callable bonds at par. But with the advent of junk bonds and periods of great interest rate volatility, issuers have been provided with powerful incentives to explore the relatively uncharted waters of par calls. This Article examines the authority for and legality of such par calls and ultimately proposes a redefinition of the issuer-bondholder relationship. This redefinition accounts for the realities of the marketplace and should lead a return to more settled expectations in both …

Corporate Ethics: Approaches And Implications To Expanding The Corporate Mindset Of Profitability, 49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 637 (2018), Arthur Acevedo

Arthur Acevedo

This Article discusses the convergence of law and ethics in the context of corporations. It begins by detailing past attempts at and limitations on regulating corporate conduct. It then explores the business judgment rule in the context of ethical conduct. Finally, it considers the growing influence of millennials and social investing on corporate conduct, and concludes by cautioning corporate directors to adopt ethical practices in order to remain relevant in the marketplace.

Teaching Specialized Legal Research: Business Associations, Kris Helge, Terri Lynn Helge

Terri L. Helge

Business associations are a complex substantive topic that can be included in an advanced legal research course that teaches students sophisticated research, writing, and citation skills. This article presents the basic substantive law regarding business associations necessary to deliver instruction about advanced legal research, writing, and citation. This article also offers a model syllabus with suggested sources and assignments for students. These research assignments require students to perform tasks such as citing primary and secondary sources, learning advanced research skills using loose-leaf materials, assimilating information from multiple sources into cogent narratives, locating information using various electronic resources, digests, and other …

Law’S Facilitating Role In The Field Of Social Enterprise., Evelyn Brody

Evelyn Brody

How Irrational Actors In The Ceo Suite Affect Corporate Governance, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

No abstract provided.

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Brief Of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Harold Kent Greenfield, Daniel A. Rubens

Kent Greenfield

Professor Greenfield was the principal author of an amicus brief on behalf of 33 corporate law professors in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, argued in December 2017. The brief argues that shareholders’ religious and political beliefs should not be projected onto a corporation for purposes of First Amendment accommodation.