Law Commons^™

Drifting Down The Dnieper With Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About The Place Of Compliance Programs In Federal Criminal Sentencing (Symposium), Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

This Article explains how the federal organizational sentencing guidelines work and how they have created incentives for businesses to set up compliance programs. It then considers the paucity of evidence that compliance programs actually prevent the occurrence of corporate crime. It also questions whether investments in compliance programs make sense even for companies caught in a federal criminal investigation. There is little evidence that compliance programs have any significant effect on the likelihood that federal prosecutors will file criminal charges in the first instance. Even more surprisingly, examination of U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics reveals that the compliance program movement seems …

Understanding New Hampshire’S Rule 4.2 As Applied To Corporate Litigants: An Explanation And Suggestions For Improvement, Heather Menezes

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “Consider this scenario: an attorney represents a client in litigation against a corporation. The attorney gets a call from an employee of that corporation and the employee says, “Everything in your complaint is absolutely correct.” However excited the attorney is to speak with this person, the Rules of Professional Conduct constrain whom the attorney can talk to if a corporation is involved in the pending litigation. In New Hampshire, any attorney can quickly find that Rule 4.2 prohibits contact with a represented party.1 But is this corporate employee a represented party? Even after reading the comment to the rule …

A Team Production Theory Of Bankruptcy Reorganization, Lynn M. Lopucki

Vanderbilt Law Review

In the year before United Airlines filed for bankruptcy reorganization, the firm lost $3.2 billion. Fierce competition in the airline industry prevents United from stemming its losses solely through increases in revenues. Costs will have to be cut. The necessary expense reductions could come from reductions in employee pay and benefits, reductions in the amounts owing to creditors (which reduce interest expense), or both. Which should it be? United's situation is complicated by the fact that its employees own 55 percent of its stock and that their wage levels are protected by a collective bargaining agreement. But if we assume …

The Irrelevance Of State Corporate Law In Governance Of Public Companies, J. Robert Brown Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Globalization (Americanization?) Of Executive Pay, Randall Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterized by a strong emphasis on pay-for-performance and by a highly lucrative "upside." There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalize in accordance with this pattern. This Article assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. After surveying briefly the key components of managerial remuneration and after examining the essential elements of the "U.S. pay paradigm," the Article considers market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global compensation imperative." These include wider dispersion of share ownership, more cross-border hiring of executives, growing international merger and …

A Road Map For Corporate Governance In East Asia, Chee Keong Low

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Much has transpired since the inadequacies of corporate governance practices in East Asia were glaringly exposed by the Asian financial crisis. The crisis brought to the foreground numerous deficiencies, which had common roots in excessive over-leverage as well as the lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability. These issues have been explicitly recognized with the release of the White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia by the Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance in June 2003.

By responding in part to the White Paper, this article sets out a "roadmap" whose ultimate objective is the enhancement of the practice of corporate governance …

The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

The term virtual mergers describes the relatively recent phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided.

Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies in …

The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Vanderbilt Law Review

The business judgment rule is corporate law's central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders. Increasingly, moreover, versions of the business judgment rule are found in the law governing the other types of business organizations, ranging from such common forms as the general partnership to such unusual ones as the reciprocal insurance exchange. Yet, curiously, there is relatively little agreement as to either the theoretical underpinnings of or policy justification for the rule. This gap in our understanding has important doctrinal implications. As this paper demonstrates, a string of recent decisions by the Delaware supreme court …

Structural Bias And The Need For Substantive Review, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of the board of directors to make business decisions without judicial interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for their decisions. The business judgment rule attests to the value ascribed to authority by providing only limited judicial review for claims of breach of the duty of care, while the entire fairness test demonstrates the value ascribed to accountability by providing far more exacting scrutiny for claims of breach of the duty of loyalty. In cases involving structural bias, however, neither doctrine is appropriate. Whenever the interests of directors …

Sarbanes Oxley Act And Fiduciary Duties, Lyman Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

No abstract provided.