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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
When Vertical Is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead To Increases In “Effective Concentration”, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
When Vertical Is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead To Increases In “Effective Concentration”, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and we refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (i) vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures), and (ii) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among …
Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).
Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop
Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plaintiff's success probability to fall below the efficient level--a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the problem, but …
Recommendations And Comments On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Recommendations And Comments On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
These recommendations and comments respond to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. We commend the agencies for updating the 1984 non-horizontal merger guidelines by recognizing the substantial advances in economic thinking about vertical mergers in the thirty-five years since those guidelines were issued. Our comments emphasize four issues: (i) the treatment of the elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”), particularly that the draft vertical merger guidelines appear inappropriately to make proof of cognizability part of the agencies burden and that they appear to …
Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We also show that it then is possible to calculate an effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market. We refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward …
The Future (Public Company Boardroom) Is Female: From California Sb 826 To A Gender Diversity Listing Standard, Sunitha Malepati
The Future (Public Company Boardroom) Is Female: From California Sb 826 To A Gender Diversity Listing Standard, Sunitha Malepati
SENLC Papers & Reports
No abstract provided.