Law Commons^™

Antitrust & Ai Supply Chains, Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

Scholarly Works

Will AI technology disrupt the current Big Tech Barons, foster competition, and ensure future disruptive innovation that improves our well-being? Or might the technology help a few ecosystems become even more powerful?

To explore this issue, our paper outlines the current digital market dynamics that lead to winner-take-most-or-all ecosystems. After examining the emerging AI foundation model supply chain, we consider several potential antitrust risks that may emerge should certain layers of the supply chain become concentrated and firms extend their power across layers. But the anticompetitive harms are not inevitable, as several countervailing factors might lessen or prevent these antitrust …

Innovation Misunderstood, Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

Scholarly Works

Innovation is transformative and key to future prosperity. It is therefore of no surprise that antitrust laws seek to promote it. What is surprising, however, is that despite the central role that innovation occupies in competition cases, its actual treatment by the courts is far from nuanced.

In this paper, we reflect on the D.C. Circuit’s 2023 ruling in N.Y. v Meta to illustrate the prevailing monocular vision adopted by the court in its treatment of innovation. That vision, we argue, reflects simplistic assumptions as to innovation dynamics and mistaken beliefs about the digital economy. It is further compounded by …

Addressing Personal Data Collection As Unfair Methods Of Competition, Maurice E. Stucke

Scholarly Works

Enforcers, policymakers, scholars, and the public are concerned about Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and recently Microsoft and their influence. That influence comes in part from personal data. These companies are “data-opolies,” in that they are powerful firms that control our data. The data comes from their vital ecosystems of interlocking online platforms and services, which attract users; sellers; advertisers; website publishers; and software, app, and accessory developers.

The public sentiment is that a few companies, in possessing so much data, possess too much power. Something is amiss. Cutting across political lines, many Americans think Big Tech’s economic power is a …

The Role Of Secondary Algorithmic Tacit Collusion In Achieving Market Alignment, Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

Scholarly Works

The antitrust risks associated with the use of the same hub’s pricing algorithm by many sellers are now well-accepted. But what if many rivals use several different hubs for dynamic pricing? The common assumption is that in such instances, competition among the pricing hubs would support competition among the sellers. However, in this paper we argue differently and introduce the concept of secondary algorithmic tacit collusion, which leads to anticompetitive effects, independent of the conditions on the primary market. This phenomenon may lead to the evils of price-fixing but on far a wider scale. Contrary to traditional tacit collusion, this …

Interactive Antitrust Federalism: Antitrust Enforcement In Tennessee Then And Now, Clark L. Hildabrand

Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law

In light of the recent debates surrounding the proper relationship between federal and state antitrust enforcement, this Paper explores the early years of state antitrust enforcement to see how the Sherman Act impacted state antitrust law. Since Tennessee was the location of the first federal case brought under the Sherman Act and has been involved in recent indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation, this Paper particularly focuses on the development of antitrust law within Tennessee. Before the Sherman Act, Tennessee antitrust enforcement was limited to the narrow confines of common law restraint of trade, but the implementation of the Sherman …

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …