Engineering Commons^™

Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

EMP and solar storm wide geographic coverage and ubiquitous system effects beg the question of “Where to begin?” with protection efforts. Thus, in addressing these “wide area electromagnetic (EM) effects,” we must be clever in deciding where to invest limited resources. Based on simple risk analysis, the electric power and communication infrastructures emerge as the highest priority for EM protection. Programs focused on these highest risk infrastructures will go a long way in lessoning societal impact. Given the national scope of the effects, such programs must be coordinated at the national level but implemented at local level. Because wide-area EM …

Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

Two electromagnetic phenomena have the potential to create continental-scale disasters. The first, nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), results from a nuclear detonation high above the tropopause. The second, a major solar storm, or "solar tsunami" occurs naturally when an intense wave of charged particles from the sun perturbs the earth's magnetic field. Both phenomena can debilitate electrical and electronic systems necessary for the operation of infrastructure systems and services. One reason why a U.S. protection program has yet to be initiated is that policy makers continue to wrestle with the question of where to begin, given the Department of Homeland Security’s …

Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack has provided a compelling case for protecting civilian infrastructure against the effects of EMP. As with protecting infrastructure against any hazard, it will be important to take a risk-based priority approach for EMP, recognizing that it is fiscally impracticable to protect everything. In this regard, EMP is particularly challenging in that it interferes with electrical and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all infrastructures in a simultaneous and wide-scale manner. And, for nuclear burst altitudes of 100s of kilometers, the exposed geography …

Proceedings Of The 2009 Nrc Federal Facilities Council/James Madison University Symposium On Protecting Large Facility Complexes;, George H. Baker, Cheryl E. Wilkins

George H Baker

Large, complex facilities pose unique protection challenges involving multidisciplinary expertise and collaboration among government, academia, and the private sector. The symposium served as a forum for sharing experiences in dealing with large facility catastrophic events and risk management. The symposium was organized based on the value of interaction among different people representing diverse disciplines. In many instances, such interactions lead to solutions that would not have been developed within disciplinary stovepipes. The venue was divided into three panels addressing physical security, cyber security, and real facility case studies. We were also privileged to have three keynote speakers including Dr. Charles …

Summary Of 2008 Homeland Security Symposium At The National Academies: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott

George H Baker

Recent U.S. high consequence events have made clear the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefits of such collaboration were clearly seen as a lesson from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. General Russel Honoré who led the National Guard response to Katrina has said, “We need the partnering between local, state, and federal governments; but the …

Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott

George H Baker

No critical infrastructure is self-sufficient. The complexity inherent in the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems complicates planning and preparedness for system failures. Recent wide-scale disruption of infrastructure on the Gulf Coast due to weather, and in the Northeast due to electric power network failures, dramatically illustrate the problems associated with mitigating cascading effects and responding to cascading infrastructure failures once they have occurred.

The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry …

Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems

George H Baker

This standard establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of transportable1 ground-based systems that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. Systems required to fully comply with the provisions of the standard will be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Military Department Headquarters, or a Major Command.

The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP threat environments. The standard also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection measures …