Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Education Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Education

Understanding Controversies And Ill-Structured Problems Through Argument Visualization. Curriculum And Learning Materials For Problem-Based Learning In Small Groups Of Students Who Work Autonomously On Projects With The Interactive Agora Software, Including An Exemplary Reader On Genetically Modified Plants, Michael H.G. Hoffmann Dec 2011

Understanding Controversies And Ill-Structured Problems Through Argument Visualization. Curriculum And Learning Materials For Problem-Based Learning In Small Groups Of Students Who Work Autonomously On Projects With The Interactive Agora Software, Including An Exemplary Reader On Genetically Modified Plants, Michael H.G. Hoffmann

Michael H.G. Hoffmann

No abstract provided.


Changing The World With One Cell: The Story Of Hela, Allison Roberts Aug 2011

Changing The World With One Cell: The Story Of Hela, Allison Roberts

Allison Roberts

Poster Created for the Diversity Committee Fall 2011 Culture Corner featuring The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks. Henrietta Lacks’ cell culture spawned changes in medicine, science, ethics, society and the world. This Semester’s Culture Corner features selections from UT Libraries collection that highlight the areas effected by this one human and her immortal cell.


Annual Review Of Social Partnerships Issue 6, Maria May Seitanidi May 2011

Annual Review Of Social Partnerships Issue 6, Maria May Seitanidi

Maria May Seitanidi

This is the 6th Issue of the Annual Review of Social Partnerships previously known as the NPO-BUS Partnerships Bulletin.


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …