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Full-Text Articles in Labor Relations
Reciprocally Interlocking Boards Of Directors And Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock
Reciprocally Interlocking Boards Of Directors And Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock
Kevin F Hallock
Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who …
Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock
Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock
Kevin F Hallock
[Excerpt] This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where "at least one director ... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies". Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) …
Ceo Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity: Examples Using Quantile Regression, Kevin F. Hallock, Regina Madalozzo, Clayton G. Reck
Ceo Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity: Examples Using Quantile Regression, Kevin F. Hallock, Regina Madalozzo, Clayton G. Reck
Kevin F Hallock
We provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay–firm size and pay-performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high-wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance than conditionally low-wage managers? Our results using data over a decade show, for some standard specifications, there is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to firm performance across the conditional distribution of wages. Quantile regression adds substantially to our understanding of the pay-performance relationship. This heterogeneity is masked when using more standard empirical techniques.
Managerial Pay And Governance In American Nonprofits, Kevin F. Hallock
Managerial Pay And Governance In American Nonprofits, Kevin F. Hallock
Kevin F Hallock
This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms, pay variability within and across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and managerial …
The Timeliness Of Performance Information In Determining Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock, Paul Oyer
The Timeliness Of Performance Information In Determining Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock, Paul Oyer
Kevin F Hallock
We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO). throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important …