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Labor Relations Commons

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Human Resources Management

Compensation

2013

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Labor Relations

Merit Pay For School Superintendents?, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard P. Chaykowski, Randy A. Ehrenberg Jun 2013

Merit Pay For School Superintendents?, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard P. Chaykowski, Randy A. Ehrenberg

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Given the important role that school district administrators play in the educational process, one might expect their 'performance" to be of fundamental importance in determining both how much students learn and the cost of public education to taxpayers. Yet, while public debate has considered the issue of merit pay plans for teachers, virtually no attention has been directed to the methods by which school administrators are compensated. This paper provides evidence on whether school superintendents are explicitly or implicitly rewarded for their "performance" by higher compensation and/or greater opportunities for mobility. We analyze panel data from over 700 school ...


The Education Reform Movement And The Realities Of Collective Bargaining, Robert E. Doherty, David B. Lipsky Mar 2013

The Education Reform Movement And The Realities Of Collective Bargaining, Robert E. Doherty, David B. Lipsky

David B Lipsky

[Excerpt] The response to what many believe to be a serious decline in educational achievement and standards has been, so far, a spate of studies, commissions, and reports, all aiming toward reform of the education system. Most of the recommendations that have been implemented to date have come about through state-level legislation and mandates (Darling-Hammond and Berry, 1988). Education reformers disagree on the role of teacher bargaining in achieving their objectives. One wing of the reform movement believes collective bargaining is an obstacle to change and maintains collective bargaining is one reason the schools are in bad shape. But another ...


Adverse Selection And Incentives In An Early Retirement Program, Kenneth T. Whelan, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Kevin F. Hallock, Ronald L. Seeber Jan 2013

Adverse Selection And Incentives In An Early Retirement Program, Kenneth T. Whelan, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Kevin F. Hallock, Ronald L. Seeber

Ronald G. Ehrenberg

We evaluate potential determinants of enrollment in an early retirement incentive program for non-tenure-track employees of a large university. Using administrative record on the eligible population of employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, historical employee count and layoff data by budget units, and public information on unit budgets, we find dips in per-employee finance in a budget unit during the application year and higher recent per employee layoffs were associated with increased probabilities of eligible employee program enrollment. Our results also suggest, on average, that employees whose salaries are lower than we would predict given their personal characteristics and ...