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Demand For Health Insurance: Evidence From The California And Washington Aca Marketplaces, Evan Saltzman Jan 2017

Demand For Health Insurance: Evidence From The California And Washington Aca Marketplaces, Evan Saltzman

Health Care Management Papers

I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and Washington ACA marketplaces. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies targeting adverse selection, including subsidies and the individual mandate. I find (1) high own-premium elasticities of —6.9 to —7.8, but low insurance coverage elasticities of —0.5 to —0.6; (2) minimal response to the mandate penalty amount, but significant response to the penalty's existence, suggesting consumers have a "taste for compliance"; (3) mandate repeal has minimal effect on consumer surplus because ACA subsidies already mitigate adverse selection by shielding ...


Essays In Retirement Security, Hungyee Fong May 2011

Essays In Retirement Security, Hungyee Fong

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

The first chapter “Investment Patterns in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund System” investigates how plan participants in a national defined contribution system invest their pension accumulations. I find that only a small fraction of participants elects to invest in outside investment products like professionally-managed mutual funds. Simulation results using cost data from over 200 funds demonstrate that the minimum hurdle rate of return a fund must generate is about five percent a year. Accordingly, more policy attention can be devoted to lowering fund commission charges and rationalizing the investment menu offered to participants.

In the second chapter “Longevity Risk Management ...


Essays On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard In Insurance Market, Jian Wen Aug 2010

Essays On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard In Insurance Market, Jian Wen

Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations

Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market between the ...


Reinsurance Contracting With Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard: Theory And Evidence, Zhiqiang Yan Sep 2009

Reinsurance Contracting With Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard: Theory And Evidence, Zhiqiang Yan

Risk Management and Insurance Dissertations

This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash equilibria. In the second essay, we use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance for the period 1995-2000 to test for the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that (1) adverse selection is present in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market and homeowners reinsurance market, but not in product liability reinsurance market; (2) residual moral hazard does ...


Using A Farmer's Beta For Improved Estimation Of Expected Yields, Miguel A. Carriquiry, Bruce Babcock, Chad E. Hart Apr 2008

Using A Farmer's Beta For Improved Estimation Of Expected Yields, Miguel A. Carriquiry, Bruce Babcock, Chad E. Hart

Economics Publications

Effects of sampling error in estimation of farmers' mean yields for crop insurance purposes and their implications for actuarial soundness are explored using farm- level corn yield data in Iowa. Results indicate that sampling error, combined with nonlinearities in the indemnity function, leads to empirically estimated insurance rates that exceed actuarially fair values. The difference depends on the coverage level, the number of observations used, and the participation strategy followed by farmers. A new estimator for mean yields based on the decomposition of farm yields into systemic and idiosyncratic components is proposed, which could lead to improved rate-making and reduce ...