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Full-Text Articles in Insurance

Anti-Insurance, Robert Cooter, Ariel Porat Jan 2002

Anti-Insurance, Robert Cooter, Ariel Porat

Faculty Scholarship

In standard models of contracts, efficient incentives require the promisor to pay damages for non-performance and the promisee to receive no damages. To give efficient incentives to both parties, we propose a novel contract requiring the promisor to pay damages for nonperformance to a third party, not to the promisee. In exchange for the right to damages, the third party pays the promisor and promisee in advance before performance or nonperformance occurs. We call this novel contract "anti-insurance" because it strengthens incentives by magnifying risk, whereas insurance erodes incentives by spreading risk. Anti-insurance is based on the general principle that ...


California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years Of Proposition 103, Stephen D. Sugarman Jan 1990

California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years Of Proposition 103, Stephen D. Sugarman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


On Determining The Optimal Magnitude And Length Of Liability In Torts, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Jan 1984

On Determining The Optimal Magnitude And Length Of Liability In Torts, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Faculty Scholarship

Comments on Patricia Danzon's study of tort reforms and the role of the government in private insurance markets. Risk associated with model-building process; Weakness of the study; Conclusion.