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Full-Text Articles in Insurance

Executive Incentives And Corporate Decisions: The Risk Management Channel, Jeremy O. Skog Dec 2009

Executive Incentives And Corporate Decisions: The Risk Management Channel, Jeremy O. Skog

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

This paper provides evidence that insurance executives respond to their compensation incentives by adjusting observable risk-management policy variables – the reinsurance purchase decision, type of business conducted, and firm leverage. Executive incentives are modeled by the executive sensitivity of wealth to stock price (Delta) and stock volatility (Vega). Firms respond to increased executive incentives to bear risk by purchasing less reinsurance, but also conducting less business in long-tailed lines – a change which rewards the executive through increased market volatility. The cost of altering executive incentives to effect firm policy is much less than a similar change in firm structural variables.


Controlling The Cost Of Municipal Health Insurance: Lessons From Springfield, Robert L. Carey May 2009

Controlling The Cost Of Municipal Health Insurance: Lessons From Springfield, Robert L. Carey

Edward J. Collins Center for Public Management Publications

The study finds that, by joining the Group Insurance Commission (GIC), Springfield cut increases in its health care costs an estimated $14 million to $18 million over two years. It saved an additional $5 million per year by requiring eligible municipal retirees to enroll in Medicare Part B as a precondition of receiving supplemental health coverage from the City. These two actions, together, reduced increases in the City’s health care costs an estimated 15-19% annually, on average, with savings growth each year due to compounding. Furthermore, the study estimates that if the GIC continues its past pattern of keeping ...


The Relation Between Regulation And Class Actions: Evidence From The Insurance Industry, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick Mar 2009

The Relation Between Regulation And Class Actions: Evidence From The Insurance Industry, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Standard law and economics models imply that regulation and litigation serve as substitutes. We test this by looking at the incidence of insurance class actions as a function of measures of regulatory enforcement. We also look specifically at whether states with clear regulatory standards regarding the use of OEM parts experience less litigation over this issue. We find no evidence of substitution between regulation and litigation. We also examine the possibility that litigation is more frequent in states where regulators are more likely to be captured by industry interests, finding no support for this hypothesis either. Instead, litigation is more ...


Why Are The Disability Rolls Skyrocketing? The Contribution Of Population Characteristics, Economic Conditions, And Program Generosity, Mark Duggan, Scott. A. Imberman Jan 2009

Why Are The Disability Rolls Skyrocketing? The Contribution Of Population Characteristics, Economic Conditions, And Program Generosity, Mark Duggan, Scott. A. Imberman

Health Care Management Papers

This chapter, which addresses three categories of explanation—the characteristics of individuals insured by the Disability Insurance (DI) program, the state of the economy, and the generosity of program benefits—argues that the growth in DI rolls is likely to continue and perhaps accelerate going forward. The data indicate that the recessions of 1991 and 2001 can explain 24 percent of the growth in DI receipt among men and 12 percent of the growth among women. Changes in health during the past two decades have slowed rather than added to the growth of the DI rolls. DI awards for certain ...