Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Insurance Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Insurance

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg Jan 2010

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary ...


Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1968

Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

There is limited treatment of the optimal protection of assets against casualty or liability loss. The problem of optimal insurance coverage is formally similar to the problem of optimal inventory stockage under uncertainty. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is less than the insurance coverage (inventory level), excessive insurance cost (inventory holding cost) is incurred. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is greater than the insurance coverage (inventory level), one must absorb the cost of the unrecoverable loss (sales loss). These two components of loss must be balanced in determining optimal insurance (inventory) levels.