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Law and Economics

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Insurance

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Full-Text Articles in Insurance

The Forfeiture Of Coverage Defenses Rule: An Economic Analysis, Tom Baker, Ezra Friedman, Kyle D. Logue Jul 2017

The Forfeiture Of Coverage Defenses Rule: An Economic Analysis, Tom Baker, Ezra Friedman, Kyle D. Logue

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In liability insurance, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to cover. Thus it is possible that an insurer that has a duty to defend a suit may not have the duty to cover the policyholder's liabilities in the suit. However, if the penalty for a breach of the duty to defend is limited to actual legal costs spent by the defendant, the insurer may have an incentive to refuse to defend, even when the duty to defend is clear. This occurs because the insurer will not internalize the consequences of an inadequate defense when it ultimately ...


Liability Insurer Data As A Window On Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff Jan 2015

Liability Insurer Data As A Window On Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Using the best publicly available data on lawyers’ liability claims and insurance – from the largest insurer of large law firms in the U.S., the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading insurance broker–this article reports the frequency of lawyers’ liability claims, the distribution and cost of claims by type of practice, the disposition of claims, and lawyers liability insurance premiums from the early 1980s to 2013. Notable findings include remarkable stability over thirty years in the distribution of claims by area of practice among both small and ...


Behavioral Economics And Insurance Law: The Importance Of Equilibrium Analysis, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman May 2013

Behavioral Economics And Insurance Law: The Importance Of Equilibrium Analysis, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Because choosing insurance requires consumers to assess risks and probabilities, the demand for insurance has proven to be fertile ground for identifying deviations from rational behavior. Consumers often shun the insurance against large losses that they rationally should want (e.g., floods); and they are attracted to insurance against small losses (extended warranties, low deductibles) that no rational individual should purchase. But the welfare consequences of behavioral anomalies in insurance are complex, because consumers’ irrational behavior takes place in a market profoundly shaped by informational asymmetries. Under some conditions, deviations from rational behavior may actually generate insurance market equilibria that ...


An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 1997

An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Developments In Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, Howard F. Chang Jan 1986

Developments In Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.