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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Insurance
Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value Of Choice Architecture, Eric J. Johnson, Ran Hassin, Tom Baker, Allison T. Bajger, Galen Treuer
Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value Of Choice Architecture, Eric J. Johnson, Ran Hassin, Tom Baker, Allison T. Bajger, Galen Treuer
All Faculty Scholarship
Starting this October, tens of millions will be choosing health coverage on a state or federal health insurance exchange as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We examine how well people make these choices, how well they think they do, and what can be done to improve these choices. We conducted 6 experiments asking people to choose the most cost-effective policy using websites modeled on current exchanges. Our results suggest there is significant room for improvement. Without interventions, respondents perform at near chance levels and show a significant bias, overweighting out-of-pocket expenses and deductibles. Financial incentives do …
Following English Footsteps? An Empirical Study Of Singapore's Reported Insurance Judgments And Disputes Between 1965 And 2012, Christopher C. H. Chen
Following English Footsteps? An Empirical Study Of Singapore's Reported Insurance Judgments And Disputes Between 1965 And 2012, Christopher C. H. Chen
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
This article presents an empirical study of the development of Singapore’s insurance contract law in relation to English law. The gene of Singapore’s insurance law is very English. The empirical data show a lack of momentum in driving insurance law forward by case law. This may justify further legislative reform to address not only the known doctrinal issues inherited from English law but also the specific problems facing consumer insurance. Singapore’s competitiveness in the global insurance market will be an instrumental factor to determine how far Singapore continues to follow English law in the future.
“You Want Insurance With That?” Using Behavioral Economics To Protect Consumers From Add-On Insurance Products, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
“You Want Insurance With That?” Using Behavioral Economics To Protect Consumers From Add-On Insurance Products, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
Persistently high profits on “insurance” for small value losses sold as an add-on to other products or services (such as extended warranties sold with consumer electronics, loss damage waivers sold with a car rental, and credit life insurance sold with a loan) pose a twofold challenge to the standard economic analysis of insurance. First, expected utility theory teaches that people should not buy insurance for small value losses. Second, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to charge prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance. Combining the insights of the Gabaix and Laibson shrouded …
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …