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Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons

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Articles 1 - 30 of 52

Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

Empowering Employees To Prevent Fraud In Nonprofit Organizations, John M. Bradley Jan 2015

Empowering Employees To Prevent Fraud In Nonprofit Organizations, John M. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This Article examines the significant problem of fraud within nonprofit organizations and demonstrates that current anti-fraud measures do not adequately reflect the important role employees play in perpetuating or stopping fraudulent activity. Psychological and organizational behavior studies have established the importance of (1) participation and (2) peers in shaping the behavior of individuals within the organizational context. This Article builds on that research and establishes that to successfully combat fraud, organizations must integrate employees into the design, implementation, and enforcement of anti-fraud strategy and procedures. Engaged, empowered employees will be less likely to commit fraud and more likely to dissuade ...


Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton Jan 2010

Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Treatment Differences And Political Realities In The Gaap-Ifrs Debate, William W. Bratton, Lawrence A. Cunningham Jan 2009

Treatment Differences And Political Realities In The Gaap-Ifrs Debate, William W. Bratton, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Legal And Managerial "Cultures" In Corporate Representation, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Jan 2009

Legal And Managerial "Cultures" In Corporate Representation, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Disadvantages Of Immigration Restriction As A Policy To Improve Income Distribution, Howard F. Chang Jan 2008

The Disadvantages Of Immigration Restriction As A Policy To Improve Income Distribution, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this Article, I argue that tax and transfer policies are more efficient than immigration restrictions as instruments for raising the after tax incomes of the least skilled native workers. Policies to protect these native workers frol1'l immigrant competition in the labor market do no better at promoting distributive justice and are likely to impose a greater economic burden on natives in the country of immigration than the tax alternative. These immigration restrictions are especially costly given the disproportionate burden that they place on households with working women, which discourages fel1'wle participation in the labor force. This burden ...


On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2008

On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton Jan 2008

Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look At The Financial Accounting Standards Board, William W. Bratton Jan 2007

Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look At The Financial Accounting Standards Board, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) presents a puzzle: How has this private standard setter managed simultaneously (1) to remain independent, (2) to achieve institutional stability and legitimacy, and (3) to operate in a politicized context in the teeth of op-position from its own constituents? This Article looks to governance design to account for this institutional success. The FASB’s founders made a strategic choice to create a regulatory agency that sought independence rather than political responsiveness. The FASB also set out a coherent theory of accounting, the “Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct its decisions. The Conceptual Framework ...


Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Reasonable Emissions Of Greenhouse Gases: Efficient Abatement For A Stock Pollutant, Howard F. Chang Jan 2007

Reasonable Emissions Of Greenhouse Gases: Efficient Abatement For A Stock Pollutant, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.

By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for ...


Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch Apr 2006

Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q.

This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to judge ...


The Equilibrium Content Of Corporate Federalism, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 2006

The Equilibrium Content Of Corporate Federalism, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Aggregation On The Couch: The Strategic Uses Of Ambiguity And Hypocrisy, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2006

Aggregation On The Couch: The Strategic Uses Of Ambiguity And Hypocrisy, Stephen B. Burbank

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this Essay, Professor Burbank comments on the essays by Professors Nagareda and Issacharoff. Welcoming the opportunity to revisit the interplay between procedure and substantive law and the question of democratic accountability that Professor Nagareda’s essay presents, Professor Burbank concludes that the parts of that essay are greater than the whole. He finds that Professor Nagareda’s pursuit of unifying themes and a general normative theory leads to inconsistencies in classification between procedure and substance and to an impoverished vision of institutional legitimacy. Professor Burbank voices concern that this quest, which is also evident in the current draft of ...


The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2006

The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Commment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2005

Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Commment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard Jan 2005

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.

Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional ...


Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang Jan 2005

Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2005

How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Vultures Or Vanguards?: The Role Of Litigation In Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile Jan 2004

Vultures Or Vanguards?: The Role Of Litigation In Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2004

The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Sovereign Debt Reform And The Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati Jan 2004

Sovereign Debt Reform And The Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey Jan 2004

The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Pari Passu And A Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, William W. Bratton Jan 2004

Pari Passu And A Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton Jan 2004

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly ·when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect. the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned ...


Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen Jan 2003

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the ...


The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile Jan 2003

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.