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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
Should corporate legal risk be treated similarly to corporate business risks? Currently, the law draws a clear-cut distinction between the two sources of risk, permitting the latter type of risk and banning the former. As a result, fiduciaries are shielded from personal liability in the case of business risk and are entirely exposed to civil and criminal liability that arises from legal risk-taking. As corporate law theorists have underscored, the differential treatment of business and legal risk is highly problematic from the perspective of firms and shareholders. To begin with, legal risk cannot be completely averted or eliminated. More importantly, …
You Can Run But You Can’T Hide: The Advance Of Shareholder Activism, Kendall Greenberg
You Can Run But You Can’T Hide: The Advance Of Shareholder Activism, Kendall Greenberg
CMC Senior Theses
Shareholder activism has exploded in popularity since the turn of the century, due in large part to impressive relative returns generated by its major participants. The result has thus been a surge in assets invested in the category, to in excess of $170 billion today up from less than $3 billion in 2000 (Inglis 2015; Romito 2015). This influx of capital, in absolute dollars and pace of growth, has caused many to wonder whether activists truly create shareholder value and, if so, if the value generated is sustainable. Numerous studies of activist interventions prior to 2009 reveal significant stock price …
Is Corporate Social Responsibility An Agency Problem?, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Is Corporate Social Responsibility An Agency Problem?, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This chapter examines whether CSR investments occur mostly in firms with severe agency problems, which suggests that CSR is an agency issue. We demonstrate that this is not the case: CSR investments and performance are higher when dividends are high, leverage is high, cash flows and cash holdings are low, and when there is a high managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. All these variables combined represent managerial discipline in terms of corporate investing. We also document that better legal protection of shareholder rights is positively related to CSR performance. This implies that when shareholders are more powerful relative to the management, the …
Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn
Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly governed companies outperform weakly governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with …
Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng
Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Mutual fund investors have the arduous task of disentangling luck from ability of mutual fund managers’ performance. In this paper we investigate the role of mutual fund corporate governance (measured by Morningstar Stewardship grade) in mutual fund performance. We propose an objective data-driven corporate governance score based on principal components of Morningstar Stewardship Grades. Furthermore, we establish corporate governance scores have Granger Causality on long-term risk-adjusted returns. The findings suggest that corporate governance grades of mutual funds carry information content beyond the usual star rating measures for predicting long-term mutual fund performance and provide an effective tool for selecting funds.
Il Comitato Per Il Controllo Interno E Per La Revisione Contabile Introdotto Dall’Art. 19 Del D.Lgs. 39/2010: Riflessioni In Sede Di Prima Istituzione Alla Luce Delle Indicazioni Dell’Unione Europea, Claudio Sottoriva
Claudio Sottoriva
L’esperienza nazionale in tema di costituzione di “comitati” interni all’organo amministrativo si arricchisce, alla luce del D.Lgs. 39/2010, del comitato per il controllo interno e per la revisione contabile ai sensi dell’art. 19 dello stesso. Facendo riferimento alla realtà italiana ed europea in generale si evidenzia la progressiva sperimentazione di formule compositive degli organi amministrativi e di controllo finalizzate ad una loro maggiore specializzazione secondo quanto previsto dai principali codici di autodisciplina (soprattutto avuto riguardo alle società aventi titoli negoziati in mercati regolamentati). Il comitato ex art. 19 del D.Lgs. 39/2010 è previsto per tutti gli enti di interesse nazionale …
Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten
Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten
Jordan Otten
The dichotomous worlds hypothesis holds that corporate governance systems worldwide are either based on the Anglo-American shareholder model or the Eurasian stakeholder model. We suggest a more fine-grained classification, based on five corporate governance logics –socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which all parties involved in economic productive activities structure their material interdependencies and provide meaning to the social reality of corporate life. These logics are discovered through a content analysis of the corporate governance reform codes of 38 countries.