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Full-Text Articles in Business
Does Control-Ownership Divergence Impair Market Liquidity In An Emerging Market? Evidence From China, Xiaojun Chu, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Does Control-Ownership Divergence Impair Market Liquidity In An Emerging Market? Evidence From China, Xiaojun Chu, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Qigui Liu
This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.
Does Political Capital Create Value In The Ipo Market? Evidence From China, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian
Does Political Capital Create Value In The Ipo Market? Evidence From China, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian
Qigui Liu
This study examines the value of political capital in the Chinese IPO market. We find a positive relationship between a politically connected executive and the probability of IPO approval of entrepreneurial firms. We further identify that shareholders value those connections and give a market premium to connected firms after the firms go public. We provide evidence that other types of political capital gained through external sources, such as politically connected sponsors and PE investors, also bring benefits to the firms in their IPO approval, and these connections substitute for the effect of the executive's political connections on IPO approval. We …
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Qigui Liu
This paper examines the effect that venture capital (VC) has on the pay-performancerelationship in listed Chinese firms. We find that VC has a significantly positive effect onCEO compensation and the pay-performance relationship, such effect particularly stronger infirms needing more managerial efforts and discretions (higher growth opportunity or higherlevels of capital expenditure). In addition, we show that VC-backed firms with moremanagerial discretions are more likely to use stock options. The evidence suggests thatventure capital investors use more sensitive compensation contract for top executives inChinese when the need for managerial discretion is greater. Such compensation schemes byVCs enhance firm performance subsequently.
Does Political Capital Create Value In The Ipo Market? Evidence From China, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian
Does Political Capital Create Value In The Ipo Market? Evidence From China, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian
Qigui Liu
This study examines the value of political capital in the Chinese IPO market. We find a positive relationship between a politically connected executive and the probability of IPO approval of entrepreneurial firms. We further identify that shareholders value those connections and give a market premium to connected firms after the firms go public. We provide evidence that other types of political capital gained through external sources, such as politically connected sponsors and PE investors, also bring benefits to the firms in their IPO approval, and these connections substitute for the effect of the executive's political connections on IPO approval. We …
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Qigui Liu
This paper examines the effect that venture capital (VC) has on the pay-performancerelationship in listed Chinese firms. We find that VC has a significantly positive effect onCEO compensation and the pay-performance relationship, such effect particularly stronger infirms needing more managerial efforts and discretions (higher growth opportunity or higherlevels of capital expenditure). In addition, we show that VC-backed firms with moremanagerial discretions are more likely to use stock options. The evidence suggests thatventure capital investors use more sensitive compensation contract for top executives inChinese when the need for managerial discretion is greater. Such compensation schemes byVCs enhance firm performance subsequently.