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The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Centralized And Decentralized Management Of Local Common Pool Resources In The Developing World: Experimental Evidence From Fishing Communities In Colombia, Maria Alejandra Velez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
Centralized And Decentralized Management Of Local Common Pool Resources In The Developing World: Experimental Evidence From Fishing Communities In Colombia, Maria Alejandra Velez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions— communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship …
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence From The Field, Maria Alejandra Vélez, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence From The Field, Maria Alejandra Vélez, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy
John K. Stranlund
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism. We test whether an econometric summary of subjects’ strategies is consistent with one of these motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia. As expected, average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a model of pure self-interest, but are nevertheless sub-optimal. Moreover, we find that a model of conformism …
Local Environment Control And Institutional Crowding-Out, Juan Camilo Cardenas, John K. Stranlund, Cleve Willis
Local Environment Control And Institutional Crowding-Out, Juan Camilo Cardenas, John K. Stranlund, Cleve Willis
John K. Stranlund
Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. …