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Articles 1 - 20 of 20
Full-Text Articles in Buddhist Studies
Causality, Agency, And Moral Responsibility In Nikaya Buddhism, Soo Lam Wong
Causality, Agency, And Moral Responsibility In Nikaya Buddhism, Soo Lam Wong
Comparative Philosophy
In this paper, I aim to examine the relationship between the Buddhist notions of causality and agency, the questions of whether the Buddhist notion of causality affirms causal determinism and whether the Buddhist notion of agency affirms libertarian free will, the implications of the Buddhist notions of causality and agency for moral responsibility, and the implications of the Buddhist rejection of the metaphysical self for agency and moral responsibility. My claim is that although the question of whether the early Buddhist notions of causality and agency affirm causal determinism and libertarian free will respectively remains open, they are compatible with …
Dualism And Psychosemantics: Holography And Pansematism In Early Buddhist Philosophy, Federico Divino
Dualism And Psychosemantics: Holography And Pansematism In Early Buddhist Philosophy, Federico Divino
Comparative Philosophy
In the Indian philosophical debate, the relationship between the structure of knowledge and external reality has been a persistent issue. This debate has been particularly prominent in Buddhism, as evidenced by the earliest Buddhist attestations in the Pāli canon, where reality is described as a perceptual defection. The world (loka) is perceived through cognition (citta), and the theme of designation (paññatti) is central to the analysis of the Abhidhamma. Buddhism can be viewed as navigating between nominalism and cognitive normativism, as it deconstructs language, which is seen as an obfuscating element that separates the subject from the world. In this …
Book Review On Mindfulness-Based Emotion Focused Counselling (By Padmasiri De Silva), Kathleen Higgins
Book Review On Mindfulness-Based Emotion Focused Counselling (By Padmasiri De Silva), Kathleen Higgins
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Zero, Śūnya And Pūrṇa: A Comparative Analysis, Animisha Tewari
Zero, Śūnya And Pūrṇa: A Comparative Analysis, Animisha Tewari
Comparative Philosophy
Due to apparent duality in this world, one has to face a lot of difficulties while searching for the Truth. Our ego is the root cause for perception of duality and this in turn leads to suffering. This suffering can only be extinguished by attainment of the Truth, i.e, non-duality. However, in order to enable the finite intellect to comprehend the incomprehensible non-duality, this undifferentiated whole is sometimes denoted by nothingness (śūnya) or fullness (pūrṇa). Non-duality is usually understood by the numeral ‘1’ which stands for unity or oneness. The main aim of this paper is …
Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller
Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller
Comparative Philosophy
In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of ontology.
On Types Of Certainty: From Buddhism To Islam And Beyond, Michael Chase
On Types Of Certainty: From Buddhism To Islam And Beyond, Michael Chase
Comparative Philosophy
Studies the threefold hierarchy of certainty, from its origins in Mahāyāna Buddhism, through Islam, to 17th century China. This tripartite scheme may be traced back to the ancient Buddhist scheme of the threefold wisdom as systematized by Vasubandhu of Gandhāra in the 4th-5th centuries CE. Following the advent of Islam in the 8th century, it was combined with Qur'anic notions of certainty (al-yaqīn). Initially taken up by early Islamic mystics such as Sahl al-Tustarī and al-Ḥākim al-Tirmiḏī (late 9th-early 10th centuries), the notion of yaqīn was gradually systematized into the three-level hierarchy of “knowledge or science of …
Creolizing Modern Buddhism: A Reply To Yarran Hominh & A. Minh Nguyen, Evan Thompson
Creolizing Modern Buddhism: A Reply To Yarran Hominh & A. Minh Nguyen, Evan Thompson
Comparative Philosophy
In reply to Hominh and Nguyen, I argue that “creolizing” methods in the study and practice of Buddhism should not be opposed to historicist and contextualist modes of investigation and understanding. Rather, historicism and contextualism can and should inform creolizing approaches.
Cosmopolitanism, Creolization, And Non-Exceptionalist Buddhist Modernisms: On Evan Thompson’S Why I Am Not A Buddhist, Yarran Hominh, A. Minh Nguyen
Cosmopolitanism, Creolization, And Non-Exceptionalist Buddhist Modernisms: On Evan Thompson’S Why I Am Not A Buddhist, Yarran Hominh, A. Minh Nguyen
Comparative Philosophy
In his recent book, Why I Am Not a Buddhist, Evan Thompson argues that inter-tradition or cross-cultural philosophical dialogue ought to be governed by cosmopolitan conversational norms that do not subsume any one tradition’s deep commitments under those of any other tradition, but rather bring those commitments into the discussion so that they can be challenged and defended. He argues on this basis for the application of a deeply contextualist and historicist interpretive methodology to Buddhist texts, concepts, and theories in dialogue with philosophy and contemporary cognitive sciences. Buddhist modernism, in eschewing that deeply contextualist and historicist methodology, falls …
Three Buddhist Distinctions Of Great Consequence For Cross-Cultural Philosophy Of Personal Identity, Antoine Panaïoti
Three Buddhist Distinctions Of Great Consequence For Cross-Cultural Philosophy Of Personal Identity, Antoine Panaïoti
Comparative Philosophy
This paper seeks to lay down the theoretical groundwork for the emergence of holistic cross-cultural philosophical investigations of personal identity ¾ investigations that approach the theoretical, phenomenological, psychological, and practical-ethical dimensions of selfhood as indissociable. My strategy is to discuss three closely connected conceptual distinctions that the Buddhist approach to personal identity urges us to draw, and a lucid understanding of which is essential for the emergence of appropriately comprehensive and thus genuinely cosmopolitan discussions at the cross-road between Western and Buddhist philosophical traditions. The first, primary distinction is that between the “visceral sense of self” (VSS) and the “substance …
In Search Of Buddhist Virtue: A Case For A Pluralist-Gradualist Moral Philosophy, Oren Hanner
In Search Of Buddhist Virtue: A Case For A Pluralist-Gradualist Moral Philosophy, Oren Hanner
Comparative Philosophy
Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness (sati) and loving-kindness (metta) to faith (saddhā) and wisdom (paññā). Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by neo-Aristotelian theories. …
The Illusion Of Self Revisited: Replies To Critics, Karsten J. Struhl
The Illusion Of Self Revisited: Replies To Critics, Karsten J. Struhl
Comparative Philosophy
Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a phenomenal illusion of self, whether the neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of evolutionary psychology …
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Comparative Philosophy
Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind of illusion Struhl argues it to be.
Buddhist Modernism, Scientific Explanation, And The Self, Sean Smith
Buddhist Modernism, Scientific Explanation, And The Self, Sean Smith
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Born Believer?, Mark Siderits
Empty Or Emergent Persons? A Critique Of Buddhist Personalism, Javier Hidalgo
Empty Or Emergent Persons? A Critique Of Buddhist Personalism, Javier Hidalgo
Comparative Philosophy
In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish …
What Kind Of An Illusion Is The Illusion Of Self, Karsten J. Struhl
What Kind Of An Illusion Is The Illusion Of Self, Karsten J. Struhl
Comparative Philosophy
Both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the self is an illusion. This article begins with a brief review of some of the arguments but then proceeds to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion. It analyzes three ways in which the illusion of self manifests itself – as wish fulfillment, as a cognitive illusion, and as a phenomenal illusion (what might be called the “I” sense). With respect to this last, the article reviews some recent developments in cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience to discuss the way …
Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci
Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci
Comparative Philosophy
Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation). This is examined step by step from the perspective of …
The “Indirect Message” In Kierkegaard And Chán Buddhism, Zdeněk Zacpal
The “Indirect Message” In Kierkegaard And Chán Buddhism, Zdeněk Zacpal
Comparative Philosophy
The article seeks to analyse Kierkegaard’s indirecte Meddelelse, which the author proposes to translate as ‘indirect message’. It attempts to consider and illuminate this concept and its general characteristics, types and cases in Kierkegaard's work. They are to serve as a baseline for investigations of indirect messages in Buddhism, especially the famous ‘public cases’ (gong-àn / kōan 公案) of the Chán Buddhists. The author tries to specify indirect messages on both sides of the cultural divide in terms of some Western philosophers. Kierkegaard’s theoretical rationale for his indirect message is profound, sophisticated and appropriate to the theoretical …
On What Is Real In Nāgārjuna’S “Middle Way”, Richard H. Jones
On What Is Real In Nāgārjuna’S “Middle Way”, Richard H. Jones
Comparative Philosophy
It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna’s positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed.
Recapture, Transparency, Negation And A Logic For The Catuṣkoṭi, Adrian Kreutz
Recapture, Transparency, Negation And A Logic For The Catuṣkoṭi, Adrian Kreutz
Comparative Philosophy
The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's (1975) framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir (2015) has argued that the lattices of Priest and Garfield …