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Articles 1 - 30 of 36
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer
A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer
Comparative Philosophy
Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately …
Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino
Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino
Comparative Philosophy
In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a basic affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning and logical consequences, which allow …
Three Buddhist Distinctions Of Great Consequence For Cross-Cultural Philosophy Of Personal Identity, Antoine Panaïoti
Three Buddhist Distinctions Of Great Consequence For Cross-Cultural Philosophy Of Personal Identity, Antoine Panaïoti
Comparative Philosophy
This paper seeks to lay down the theoretical groundwork for the emergence of holistic cross-cultural philosophical investigations of personal identity ¾ investigations that approach the theoretical, phenomenological, psychological, and practical-ethical dimensions of selfhood as indissociable. My strategy is to discuss three closely connected conceptual distinctions that the Buddhist approach to personal identity urges us to draw, and a lucid understanding of which is essential for the emergence of appropriately comprehensive and thus genuinely cosmopolitan discussions at the cross-road between Western and Buddhist philosophical traditions. The first, primary distinction is that between the “visceral sense of self” (VSS) and the “substance …
Social Roles And Psychological Continuity: Developing A Confucian-Psychological Continuity Hybrid Account Of Personal Identity And Ontology, Sammuel Byer
Comparative Philosophy
In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One of the final two sections of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that …
The Illusion Of Self Revisited: Replies To Critics, Karsten J. Struhl
The Illusion Of Self Revisited: Replies To Critics, Karsten J. Struhl
Comparative Philosophy
Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a phenomenal illusion of self, whether the neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of evolutionary psychology …
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Comparative Philosophy
Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind of illusion Struhl argues it to be.
Buddhist Modernism, Scientific Explanation, And The Self, Sean Smith
Buddhist Modernism, Scientific Explanation, And The Self, Sean Smith
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Born Believer?, Mark Siderits
What Kind Of An Illusion Is The Illusion Of Self, Karsten J. Struhl
What Kind Of An Illusion Is The Illusion Of Self, Karsten J. Struhl
Comparative Philosophy
Both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the self is an illusion. This article begins with a brief review of some of the arguments but then proceeds to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion. It analyzes three ways in which the illusion of self manifests itself – as wish fulfillment, as a cognitive illusion, and as a phenomenal illusion (what might be called the “I” sense). With respect to this last, the article reviews some recent developments in cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience to discuss the way …
Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci
Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci
Comparative Philosophy
Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation). This is examined step by step from the perspective of …
Book Review On Free Will, Agency And Selfhood In Indian Philosophy (Edited By Mathew R. Dasti And Edwin F. Bryant), Prabal K. Sen
Book Review On Free Will, Agency And Selfhood In Indian Philosophy (Edited By Mathew R. Dasti And Edwin F. Bryant), Prabal K. Sen
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Reply To Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, Jonardon Ganeri
Reply To Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather, Jonardon Ganeri
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Review Of Attention, Not Self By Jonardon Ganeri, Carlos Montemayor, Abrol Fairweather
Review Of Attention, Not Self By Jonardon Ganeri, Carlos Montemayor, Abrol Fairweather
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Inference, Perception, And Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Joshua Stoll
Inference, Perception, And Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Joshua Stoll
Comparative Philosophy
This paper will explore competing intuitions behind the problem of other minds. On the one hand, consciousness is strictly a self-manifest, first-person phenomenon: subjectivity is in each case one’s own. On the other hand, it is obvious, on the basis of their behavioral activity, that others are conscious agents despite this coming across through objective determinations. The tension between these intuitions is what grounds the problem of other minds. Attempts to navigate this problem generally neglect one of these intuitions and so are inadequate accounts of intersubjectivity. As such, and given the paradox involved in accepting each intuition, I argue …
In Memoriam: Richard Lane Tieszen (1951-2017)
In Memoriam: Richard Lane Tieszen (1951-2017)
Comparative Philosophy
No abstract provided.
Vol 8 No 2 Editor's Words, Bo Mou
Content Individuation And Evolutionary Content Emergence, Yujian Zheng
Content Individuation And Evolutionary Content Emergence, Yujian Zheng
Comparative Philosophy
This short paper addresses two connected issues which were brought to some focused light by Searle’s comments on my contributed article to the anthology Searle’s philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. The first issue concerns the claim that animals cannot have observer-independent intentional content of the same type as that of human beings. The second is my denial that mental content can be merely caused in specific brain states, given its holistic and normative character. I defend my position on the second issue by distinguishing content individuation from content realization while I elaborate my relatively more sophisticated argument for …
The Perspective And Perspective-Transcending Dimensions Of Consciousness And Its Double-Aboutness Character: Bridging Searle And Zhuang Zi, Bo Mou
Comparative Philosophy
What I intend to do here are closely related three things. First, in response to Searle’s “reply” comments on my previous article “Searle, Zhuang Zi, and Transcendental Perspectivism”, I will clarify and further elaborate one of the central points concerning the “perspective” dimension and “perspective-transcending” dimension of consciousness there. Second, more substantially, I will strengthen my point by explaining the “double-aboutness” character of consciousness which is intrinsically related to the foregoing two dimensions of consciousness concerning its “hooking-up-to-objects” capacity; through a semantic-ascent strategy, I will also explain how the point has substantial theoretic implications for exploring the issue of how …
Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom
Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom
Comparative Philosophy
In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity …
Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson
Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson
Comparative Philosophy
The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Searle is to compare and contrast the arguments of Hui Neng with those of …
Editor's Words, Bo Mou