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Pluralistic Perspectives On Logic: An Introduction, Colin R. Caret, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Pluralistic Perspectives On Logic: An Introduction, Colin R. Caret, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
(First paragraph) Logical pluralism is the view that there are distinct, but equally good logics. Recent years have witnessed a sharp upswing of interest in this view, resulting in an impressive literature. We only expect this trend to continue in the future. More than one commentator has, however, expressed exasperation at the view: what can it mean to be a pluralist about logic of all things? [see, e.g., Eklund (2017); Goddu (2002); Keefe (2014)]. In this introduction, we aim to set out the basic pluralist position, identify some issues over which pluralists disagree amongst themselves, and highlight the topics at …
Logical Instrumentalism And Concatenation, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Logical Instrumentalism And Concatenation, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Logical pluralism is the theory that there is more than one right logic. Logical instrumentalism is the view that a logic is a correct logic if it can be used to fruitfully pursue some deductive inquiry. Logical instrumentalism is a version of logical pluralism, since more than one logic can be used fruitfully. In this paper, I will show that a logical instrumentalist must accept linear logic as a correct logic, since linear logic is useful for studying natural language syntax. I further show that this means that the logical instrumentalist must accept a wide range of connectives, in particular …
Logical Pluralism From A Pragmatic Perspective, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Logical Pluralism From A Pragmatic Perspective, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.
A New Interpretation Of Carnap's Logical Pluralism, Teresa Kouri
A New Interpretation Of Carnap's Logical Pluralism, Teresa Kouri
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some (though not all) contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that Carnap would agree with this interpretation. Additionally, I show how this interpretation puts the Carnapian position …