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Full-Text Articles in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics

Quantification And Paradox, Edward Ferrier Mar 2018

Quantification And Paradox, Edward Ferrier

Doctoral Dissertations

I argue that absolutism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible, is to blame for both the paradoxes that arise in naive set theory and variants of these paradoxes that arise in plural logic and in semantics. The solution is restrictivism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is not possible. It is generally thought that absolutism is true and that restrictivism is not only false, but inexpressible. As a result, the paradoxes are blamed, not on illicit quantification, but on the ``logical'' conception of set which motivates naive set theory. The accepted solution is to replace this with the …


The Functions Of Russell’S No Class Theory, Kevin C. Klement Jan 2010

The Functions Of Russell’S No Class Theory, Kevin C. Klement

Kevin C. Klement

Certain commentators on Russell’s “no class” theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell’s understanding of so-called “propositional functions.” These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell did thoroughly explore these issues, and had good reasons for rejecting accounts of propositional functions as extralinguistic entities. I …


The Senses Of Functions In The Logic Of Sense And Denotation, Kevin C. Klement Jan 2010

The Senses Of Functions In The Logic Of Sense And Denotation, Kevin C. Klement

Kevin C. Klement

This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be “sense-functions,” functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or “deviant” sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two senses of the same type. An alternative treatment of the senses of functions is discussed, and is thought to …