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Full-Text Articles in Asian History
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' …
Westmoreland’S War: Reassessing American Strategy In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Westmoreland’S War: Reassessing American Strategy In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
An original and major reinterpretation of American strategy during the Vietnam War which totally reconsiders the generalship of William Westmoreland and offers a more balanced picture of the US Army in Vietnam. The book's thesis that US strategy was more than just 'attrition' confronts decades' worth of historical narratives which argue we lost in Vietnam due to bad leadership and an incorrect strategy
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally …
No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness And Progress In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness And Progress In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.