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Full-Text Articles in Asian History
“A Disconnected Dialogue: American Military Strategy, 1964-1968,” Oklahoma Humanities, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall-Winter 2017., Gregory A. Daddis
“A Disconnected Dialogue: American Military Strategy, 1964-1968,” Oklahoma Humanities, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall-Winter 2017., Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
"The admission, supported by a careful reading of the historical record, begs larger questions: How do we remember American strategy in Vietnam? What language do we use to describe a war that proved so tragic, not only for the United States but, perhaps more importantly, for the millions of Vietnamese who lost their lives in a decades-long civil war? In coming to grips with a complex war, Americans, then and now, have relied on a series of tropes to streamline their conversations about a distasteful war."
Faith In War: The American Roots Of Global Conflict, Gregory A. Daddis
Faith In War: The American Roots Of Global Conflict, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
War has become a form of secular religion for many Americans in the modern era. Much of our deployment of military power during the last 50 years has rested on a set of absolute beliefs about the overall utility of war. In the process, policymakers and citizens alike maintain an enduring faith that the United States, via its military forces, has the power to transform societies abroad.
Review Of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of Nick Turse's Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam.
Eating Soup With A Spoon: The U.S. Army As A "Learning Organization" In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
Eating Soup With A Spoon: The U.S. Army As A "Learning Organization" In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
Standard Vietnam War narratives often argue that the U.S. Army lost the war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an unconventional conflict. Based on a reappraisal of learning processes rather than on the outcome of the war, this essay argues that as an organization, the U.S. Army did learn and adapt in Vietnam; however, that learning was not sufficient, in itself, to preserve a South Vietnam in the throes of a powerful nationalist upheaval. A reexamination of the Army's strategic approach, operational experiences, and organizational changes reveals that significant learning did occur during the Vietnam …
On Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
On Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley.
Review Of A Question Of Command: Counterinsurgency From The Civil War To Iraq, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of A Question Of Command: Counterinsurgency From The Civil War To Iraq, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, by Mark Moyar.
Review Of The Battle Of An Loc, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of The Battle Of An Loc, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of The Battle of An Loc, by James H. Willbanks.