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Even Friends Cannot Have All Things In Common: Aristotle's Critique Of Plato's Republic, Christos C. Evangeliou Dec 1995

Even Friends Cannot Have All Things In Common: Aristotle's Critique Of Plato's Republic, Christos C. Evangeliou

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle considered as the core of Plato's ideal polity the proposal of communism in its double form, community of women and children and community of property for the guardians who, thus, would be able to provide the means to achieving the perfect unification of the state. Aristotle objected to these innovations and came out as a defender of common sense and common Greek political practice. His arguments were intended to show not only the impracticability of Plato's proposals and their incompatibility with common Greek practices but also their undesirability. He believed that, human nature being what it is, a political …

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Plato's Theologia Revisited, Gerard Naddaf Dec 1995

Plato's Theologia Revisited, Gerard Naddaf

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The word theologia is attested for the first time in Plato’s Republic II, 379a4: Hoi tupoi peri theologias. According to Werner Jaeger (The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford 1947, 4-‐13), Plato coined the word to support the introduction of a new doctrine which resulted from a conflict between the mythical and the natural (rational) approach to the problem of God. For Jaeger, the word theologia designates what Aristotle was later to call theologikê or “first philosophy (hê protê philosophia) – whence his translation of hoi tupoi peri theologias by “outlines of theology.” Victor Goldschmidt, for his part, in …

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Material Alteration And Cognitive Activity In Aristotle's De Anima, John Sisko Dec 1995

Material Alteration And Cognitive Activity In Aristotle's De Anima, John Sisko

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper, I would like to sketch my account of the relation between cognitive activity and material alteration within Aristotle's psychological theory. I will begin by suggesting a new framework through which to view the important issues (§2). I will then show that on Aristotle's account material alteration is required both for any episode of perception in animals taken generally (§3) and for any episode of thought in human beings (§4). Finally, I will examine Aristotle's rationale for supposing that material alteration is required for human thought (§5).

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Sagp Newsletter 1995-96.2 November, Anthony Preus Nov 1995

Sagp Newsletter 1995-96.2 November, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of the panels of SAGP with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association December 28 in New York and with the American Philological Association December 28 in San Diego.

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Dialectic And Definition In Aristotle's Topics, May Sim Apr 1995

Dialectic And Definition In Aristotle's Topics, May Sim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The middle term between dialectic and being is definition. Definitions are formulae of essences or substances. Thus, one’s view of substance will depend on one’s view of definition: what a definition is, and how it is acquired. Further, insofar as definitions are arrived at through dialectic, definitions depend on dialectic. That is, the specific procedure of dialectic shapes the mode of definition, and the mode of definition shapes the notion of being. Not only does dialectic shape being through definition, but being and knowledge of it also determines dialectic. In short, these three things go together: dialectic, definition and being. …

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Aristotle's Child: Formation Through Genes, Oikos, Polis, Daryl Mcgowan Tress Apr 1995

Aristotle's Child: Formation Through Genes, Oikos, Polis, Daryl Mcgowan Tress

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The discussion of children in Pol VII and the linking of nature, habit and reason supports our thesis that Aristotle has a composite conception of the child and that it can be reconstituted by way of a linked examination of his analyses in the biology, ethics and politics.The child has his or her beginnings prior to birth and grows from unfinished to finished adulthood through linked phases. Each phase of development has its own telos - the complete human animal nature at birth, the complete ethical character later on, and the cultured, educationally complete person ready for adult life in …

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Aristotle On The Αρχή Of Practical Reasoning: Countering The Influence Of Sub-Humeanism, Lynn Holt Mar 1995

Aristotle On The Αρχή Of Practical Reasoning: Countering The Influence Of Sub-Humeanism, Lynn Holt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My central aim is to show that Aristotle convincingly avoids what has been the linchpin of the dominant contemporary view of the starting point of practical reasoning: that practical reasoning must begin, both normatively and motivationally, with some desire or want (call this sub-Humeanism). My task is made more difficult by the presence of a now common interpretation of Aristotle himself in which desire is both normatively and motivationally super-ordinate. On this view, Aristotle cannot be a genuine alternative to the contemporary view, since he just is a contemporary: Aristotle is the first sub-Humean about practical reasoning.

In order to …

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An Aristotelian Definition Of Friendship, Paul Schollmeier Mar 1995

An Aristotelian Definition Of Friendship, Paul Schollmeier

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My paper explicates the Aristotelian definition of friendship, and it demonstrates that friendship for Aristotle can be either altruistic or egoistic. Aristotelian friendship includes three species, one of which is altruistic and two of which are egoistic. Good friendship is essentially friendship, and it is for the sake of another. Useful and pleasant friendships are accidentally friendships, and they are for the sake of oneself.

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Society For Ancient Greek Philosophy Bylaws, Sagp Mar 1995