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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.
Smart Sheep Need More Protection, Michael L. Woodruff
Smart Sheep Need More Protection, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
The target article unequivocally establishes that sheep are far more intelligent and cognitively sophisticated than is generally acknowledged. For this reason, the authors advocate for significantly more stringent regulation of agricultural and research practices when sheep are used. I briefly review the existing US regulations governing the use of sheep in research and discuss the extent to which they are applied to sheep. I then discuss weaknesses in the current regulations, concluding that they should be changed to mandate housing all research animals in environments that accommodate the psychosocial needs of each species.
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Animal Sentience
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.