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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
What Types Of Arguments Are There?, James B. Freeman
What Types Of Arguments Are There?, James B. Freeman
OSSA Conference Archive
Our typology is based on two ground adequacy factors, one logical and one epistemic. Logically, the step from premises to conclusion may be conclusive or only ceteris paribus. Epistemically, warrants may be backed a priori or a posteriori. Hence there are four types of arguments: conclusive a priori, defeasible a priori, defeasible a posteriori, and prima facie conclusive a posteriori. We shall give an example of each and compare our scheme with other typologies.
Defeasibility From The Perspective Of Informal Logic, Ralph H. Johnson
Defeasibility From The Perspective Of Informal Logic, Ralph H. Johnson
OSSA Conference Archive
The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of interest in various research communities. Here I want to focus on their use in logic and argumentation studies. I will approach these topics from the perspective of an informal logician who finds himself struggling with some issues that surround the idea of and the deployment of the concept of defeasibility. My intention is to make those struggles as clear as I can.
The Epistemic Relevance Of Social Considerations In Ordinary Day-To-Day Presumptions, Fred J. Kauffeld
The Epistemic Relevance Of Social Considerations In Ordinary Day-To-Day Presumptions, Fred J. Kauffeld
OSSA Conference Archive
The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.