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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
God And Eternal Boredom, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
God And Eternal Boredom, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Attila Tanyi
Multidimensional Consequentialism And Risk, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Multidimensional Consequentialism And Risk, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Attila Tanyi
Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism And Degrees Of Rightness, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism And Degrees Of Rightness, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Attila Tanyi
Moral Demands And Ethical Theory: The Case Of Consequentialism, Attila Tanyi
Moral Demands And Ethical Theory: The Case Of Consequentialism, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists …
On The Intrinsic Value Of Genetic Integrity, Attila Tanyi
On The Intrinsic Value Of Genetic Integrity, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Ought We To Forget What We Cannot Forget? A Reply To Sybille Schmidt, Attila Tanyi
Ought We To Forget What We Cannot Forget? A Reply To Sybille Schmidt, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
This is a short response to Sybille Schmidt's paper (in the same volume) "Is There an Ethics of Forgetting?". The response starts out by admitting that forgetting is an essential function of human existence, that it serves, as it were, an important evolutionary function: that it is good, since it contributes to our well-being, to have the ability to forget. But this does not give us as answer, affirmative or not, to Schmidt’s title question: “Is There an Ethics of Forgetting?” The main impediment to answering this question, certainly to answering it in the affirmative, seems to be a problem …
How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Attila Tanyi
Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the final part of the paper, we propose implementations of the new methodology as applied to the experimental investigation of …
Pure Cognitivism And Beyond, Attila Tanyi
Pure Cognitivism And Beyond, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would still not follow that desire is identical with the state of being motivated. When this negative work is done, the …
Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Attila Tanyi
According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist …
Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Attila Tanyi
An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the intuition, the paper reports empirical evidence of how people see the normative significance of consequentialist requirements.. In a scenario …
Immortal Curiosity, Attila Tanyi, Karl Karlander
Immortal Curiosity, Attila Tanyi, Karl Karlander
Attila Tanyi
The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this dilemma, namely Williams’ requirement of the constancy of character of the immortal, is defensible. We next argue against a recent attempt that accepts the dilemma, but rejects the conclusion Williams draws from it. From these we conclude that blocking the second horn of the dilemma is the best way to respond to Williams. Our objection contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature …
Silencing Desires?, Attila Tanyi
Silencing Desires?, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The Case For Authority, Attila Tanyi
The Case For Authority, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are unacceptably demanding. This is called the Overdemandingness Objection. The paper first distinguishes three interpretations of the Objection as based on the three dimensions of moral demands: scope, content, and authority. It is then argued that neither the scope, nor the content-based understanding of the Objection is viable. Constraining the scope of consequentialism is neither helpful, nor justified, hence the pervasiveness of consequentialism cannot be the ground for the Objection. Although recent approaches interpret the Objection as a claim about the excessively demanding content …
Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi
Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi
Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal …
Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi
Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case they can …
Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi
Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non- descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, does not answer the pressing concern behind Parfit’s charge. I conclude that we had better turn to the third …