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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
But What Kind Of Badness?: An Inquiry Into The Ethical Significance Of Pain, Andrew L. Hookom
But What Kind Of Badness?: An Inquiry Into The Ethical Significance Of Pain, Andrew L. Hookom
Philosophy Theses
In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I argue it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-conditional …
Nietzsche On Copernicus, Shane C. Callahan
Nietzsche On Copernicus, Shane C. Callahan
Philosophy Theses
I show that we have reason to believe a view on scientific theory change can be discerned in what I call the “Copernicus passages” of Nietzsche’s published work—specifically, the incommensurability thesis. Since this view denies what Maudemarie Clark calls the “equivalence principle,” she claims incommensurability cannot reasonably be attributed to Nietzsche. I argue, however, that we can reasonably attribute incommensurability to Nietzsche in the Copernicus passages, so my reading should not be ruled out. The first upshot to this project is that I provide a reading of passages that have received no scholarly attention to date. The second upshot is …
Autonomy, De Facto And De Jure, Paul Tulipana
Autonomy, De Facto And De Jure, Paul Tulipana
Philosophy Theses
On a standard philosophical conception, being autonomous is roughly equivalent to having some particular natural capacity. This paper provides argues that this conception is incorrect, or at least incomplete. The first chapter suggests that adopting an alternative conception of autonomy promises to resolve to several objections to the metaethical constitutivism, and so promises to provide highly desirable theory of moral reasons. The second chapter first motivates a broadly Kantian account of autonomous action, and then gives reasons to think that Kant's own development of this theory runs into damaging action-theoretic problems. The way to address these problems, I argue, is …