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Articles 1 - 30 of 1461
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
A Commentary On Tracy Bowell’S “Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm”, Mark Battersby
A Commentary On Tracy Bowell’S “Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm”, Mark Battersby
OSSA Conference Archive
A commentary on Tracy Bowell's Whataboutisms, Arguments and Argumentative Harm summarizing her arguments and suggesting that the use of "argumentative harm" is not a helpful way to identify fallacious uses of "whatabout" questions.
Recovery And Reconstruction Of Principles Of Academic Debate As Dialectical Model: An Outline Of A Procedural Model Of Argumentative Rationality, Curtis Scott Jacobs
Recovery And Reconstruction Of Principles Of Academic Debate As Dialectical Model: An Outline Of A Procedural Model Of Argumentative Rationality, Curtis Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
Academic debate theory has developed over 125 years. According to debate theory, reasonable argumentation satisfies six obligations: (1) self-administration; (2) making prima facie/presumptively adequate moves; (3) clash; (4) meeting the burden of proof; (5) rejoinder/rebuttal; and (6) extension. These obligations define a kind of procedural rationality of argumentation distinct from the kinds of rationality elaborated by logical and rhetorical theories. Those obligations are grounded in the pragmatics of conversation and visible in debate practice.
Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm, Tracy A. Bowell
Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm, Tracy A. Bowell
OSSA Conference Archive
Whataboutisms have received scant attention in argumentation theory, yet they are common persuasive moves in debates about social and political issues and can occur in the form of arguments. This paper analyses these arguments, showing that while whataboutisms tend to make for bad arguments, there can be instances of good argument employing a whataboutist move. The final section of the paper considers arguments employing whataboutsims as instances of argumentative harm.
Commentary On Petar Bodlović: "Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations", David Godden
Commentary On Petar Bodlović: "Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations", David Godden
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On: Christina Pontoppidan’S “Where Do You Place Your Argument? The Toulmin Model Revisited And Revised From A Rhetorical Perspective”, Manfred E. Kraus
Commentary On: Christina Pontoppidan’S “Where Do You Place Your Argument? The Toulmin Model Revisited And Revised From A Rhetorical Perspective”, Manfred E. Kraus
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On Marcin Lewińksi’S “Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism”, John P. Casey
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski
Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski
OSSA Conference Archive
The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the dubious assumptions about language and meaning hidden in the dominant accounts of the straw man fallacy. I will argue that against the background of the resurgent conception of language as an underdetermined and in-principle negotiable entity (Dorr & Hawthorne 2014; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), some alleged straw man attacks are better seen as reasonable moves in the metalinguistic disagreements permeating our ordinary argumentative practice.
Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations, Petar Bodlović
Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations, Petar Bodlović
OSSA Conference Archive
On the standard view, there are different types of presumptions but, nevertheless, they all asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I distinguish two meanings of the “burden of proof” and argue that two types of presumptions, practical and cognitive ones, allocate the burden of proof in different senses. Consequently, the standard accounts of presumptions are either more fragmented than scholars usually admit, or they have lower explanatory potential.
Where Do You Place Your Argument?, Christina Pontoppidan
Where Do You Place Your Argument?, Christina Pontoppidan
OSSA Conference Archive
Toulmin’s logical approach to argumentation affects the purpose and design of his argument model. The author argues that, even though the model has proven useful and influential in the rhetorical tradition, it misses the most central aspects of persuasive argumentation and the rhetorical role of the topics. The author outlines a rhetorical argument model that takes the metaphor of places seriously and shows the process of building a persuasive argument guided by different types of topical places.
Reply To Commentary On “Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence”, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
Reply To Commentary On “Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence”, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Evidence In Argumentation-Based Litigation (Alg): Comments On Xiong's And Du's Paper, Marko Novak
Evidence In Argumentation-Based Litigation (Alg): Comments On Xiong's And Du's Paper, Marko Novak
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On Macagno And Rapanta, “Coding Empathy”, José Ángel Gascón
Commentary On Macagno And Rapanta, “Coding Empathy”, José Ángel Gascón
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On Harmony Peach’S “Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes”, Moira L. Kloster
Commentary On Harmony Peach’S “Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes”, Moira L. Kloster
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, we will present an argumentative view of legal evidence. In an argumentation-based litigation game, the only purpose of the suitor (S) or the respondent (R) is to maximize their own legal rights while the purpose of the trier (T) is to maintain judicial fairness and justice. Different selections of evidence and different orders of presenting evidence will lead to different case-facts and even adjudicative results, the purpose of litigation is to reconcile a balance among the three parties - S, R, and T.
Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach
Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, Douglas Walton’s Argumentation Schemes and corresponding critical questions are taken through Thomas Huckin’s (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis in order to further demonstrate that a schematic-pragmatic approach to argument evaluation needs to account for bias in and of itself. Building on the work of Audrey Yap (2013, 2015) and Ciurria and Al Tamini (2014) which demonstrates how the schemes have not addressed, and may even intensify, various disadvantages people with systemic identity prejudices face, Huckin’s approach offers additional nuance as to how these concerns can be exacerbated by the schemes. As the schemes have been devised through observations …
Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta
Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta
OSSA Conference Archive
In rhetoric, empathy – the ability to put oneself inside the interlocutor’s position in an argument – has been considered as the bridge between the orator and the interlocutors. Despite its crucial importance, no studies have addressed the challenge of operationalizing this concept, translating it into proxies that can be used for determining how empathic a dialogue is. This paper intends to propose a coding scheme for capturing two dimensions of empathy in dialogue – otherness and relevance.
Commentary On Yun Xie's "The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered", Derek Allen
Commentary On Yun Xie's "The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered", Derek Allen
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On Jens Kjeldsen’S “What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Everyday Life?”, Harry Weger Jr.
Commentary On Jens Kjeldsen’S “What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Everyday Life?”, Harry Weger Jr.
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered, Robert Xie
The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered, Robert Xie
OSSA Conference Archive
The notion of on-balance premise has played a crucial role in understanding the structure of conduction. It is a widely accepted view that in any third-pattern conductive argument there is always an implicit on-balance premise which represents a judgment that the positive reasons for the conclusion have outweighed the counter-considerations against it. This paper aims to provide a critical examination of the notion, and to reveal its inadequacy as a theoretical tool. First, it argues that the notion of on-balance premise has rested upon a metaphor of outweighing that is too simplistic to characterize the weighing and balancing between reasons …
Connectives And Straw Men. Experimental Approach On French And English., Jennifer Schumann, Sandrine Zufferey
Connectives And Straw Men. Experimental Approach On French And English., Jennifer Schumann, Sandrine Zufferey
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, we present experiments designed to assess the role of causal connectives with an attributive meaning (e.g. since and puisque ) on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. Our results show that connectives play a role for the detection of straw man fallacies by increasing readers’ awareness to the speaker’s persuasive intent, thus creating a forewarning effect. We also uncover a crucial difference between causal connectives both within and across languages. Taken together, our experiments plead in favor of conducting fine-grained analyses of connectives in different languages in order to deepen our understanding of their role for argumentation.
What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Our Everyday Life? Working Through Evidence And Persuasion, Events And Experiences., Jens E. Kjeldsen
What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Our Everyday Life? Working Through Evidence And Persuasion, Events And Experiences., Jens E. Kjeldsen
OSSA Conference Archive
We know almost nothing about the reasoning that makes people change their minds in everyday life. Which role do arguments play in contrast to personal relations and ethos? Are people persuaded to change, or does change rather follow personal experiences? This paper examines the epistemologies people use to rhetorically work through their opinions, when moving from one conviction to another. The paper is based on research interviews with people who have changed their minds.
Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer
Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On "The Problem Of Mission Creep", Curtis Scott Jacobs
Commentary On "The Problem Of Mission Creep", Curtis Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Comments On Wagemans' "Argument Levers", Hans Vilhelm Hansen
Comments On Wagemans' "Argument Levers", Hans Vilhelm Hansen
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
The Problem Of Mission Creep: Argumentation Theory Meets Military History, Tone Kvernbekk, Ola Bøe-Hansen, Ole A. Heintz, Daniel H. Cohen
The Problem Of Mission Creep: Argumentation Theory Meets Military History, Tone Kvernbekk, Ola Bøe-Hansen, Ole A. Heintz, Daniel H. Cohen
OSSA Conference Archive
At the outset ‘mission creep’ is a military phenomenon, denoting uncontrolled and unintended mission development. Even the best-laid plans may become obsolete if they run against the facts on the ground, and mission creep may result. Mission creep also plagues arguments, as when arguments end up in unrelated topics, larger targets, or clusters of topics. Our paper explores possible mutual benefits of applying the resources of argumentation theory and military theory to one another.
Why Missing Premises Can Be Missed: Evaluating Arguments By Determining Their Lever, Jean H.M. Wagemans
Why Missing Premises Can Be Missed: Evaluating Arguments By Determining Their Lever, Jean H.M. Wagemans
OSSA Conference Archive
By taking an argument to consist of one premise and one conclusion, the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) excludes from its conceptualization the element traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’ or ‘warrant’ – which is often missing from the discourse. This paper answers the question of how to evaluate the underlying mechanism of an argument by presenting a method for formulating its ‘argumentative lever’ based on an identification of its type.
Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study, Moti Mizrahi, Michael Dickinson
Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study, Moti Mizrahi, Michael Dickinson
OSSA Conference Archive
Philosophers tend to think of themselves as model arguers and that the best kind of argument is deductive arguments, i.e., the most persuasive arguments where the premises provide the best evidence for conclusions. This raises the question: Do philosophers make the best type of arguments? If deductive arguments are indeed the best, and philosophers are model arguers, is it the case that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than other kinds of argument? We set out to investigate this question empirically. Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR …
Defeasible A Priori Warrants: Evidence, Diversity Of Opinion, And Strength, Scott F. Aikin
Defeasible A Priori Warrants: Evidence, Diversity Of Opinion, And Strength, Scott F. Aikin
OSSA Conference Archive
This is a commentary on James Freeman's “Defeasible A Priori Warrants.”
Commentary: Peitho And The Consolation Of Philosophy: A Reply To Blake D. Scott, G Thomas Goodnight
Commentary: Peitho And The Consolation Of Philosophy: A Reply To Blake D. Scott, G Thomas Goodnight
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Commentary On: Mark Weinstein’S “Warranting Evidence In Diverse Evidentiary Settings”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Commentary On: Mark Weinstein’S “Warranting Evidence In Diverse Evidentiary Settings”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro
OSSA Conference Archive
This commentary consists of three parts. The first attempts to summarize the main theme of Weinstein’s paper, insofar as I can understand it; the latter qualification is obvious and almost redundant, except that I must confess I found it very challenging to make sense of his essay. The second part of my commentary advances some negative criticism of his paper, by focusing on issues of conceptual clarity and argumentative cogency. The third part elaborates a positive appreciation of what seems to be Weinstein’s main claim; I do so mostly on the basis of things which he does not even mention, …