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Philosophy

Philosophy

Journal

Global Tides

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Criticisms Of Evidentialism:A Critique Of Jonathan Way’S Solutions To The Issues Of Evidentialism, Kailey Echeverria Apr 2024

Criticisms Of Evidentialism:A Critique Of Jonathan Way’S Solutions To The Issues Of Evidentialism, Kailey Echeverria

Global Tides

This paper will begin with a brief introduction of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee’s definitions and examples ascribed to their original argument for Evidentialism in order to provide context for the remainder of the paper. The paper will turn to Jonathan Way’s concerns surrounding the original argument for Evidentialism, and break down his revamped definitions of Evidentialism and what Way calls “incentives”. Then, the paper will turn to Way’s solutions to the concerns he addressed, where he introduces the “argument from good reasoning” and the Link principal, a modified and refreshed version of Feldman and Conee’s “argument from reasoning”. Further …


The Ethical Motive As Counter To Benatar’S Anti-Natalism, Eliot Cox Apr 2024

The Ethical Motive As Counter To Benatar’S Anti-Natalism, Eliot Cox

Global Tides

In multiple works, David Benatar defends the view that it is immoral for parents to have children under any circumstance due to the suffering inherent in human life. This essay argues that Benatar’s anti-natalist argument is not successful because of its misidentification of the proper motive humans should have if they are to exist. Instead, I argue, the benefits of an ethical motive, if such a motive is properly instilled within a child by their parents or guardians, can surmount the suffering caused by existence. An ethical motive is characterized by the goal of alleviating suffering for others before oneself. …


Denominational Incompatibility And Religious Pluralism: A Non-Pluralist Response To A Pluralist Critique, Matthew Stinson Jan 2018

Denominational Incompatibility And Religious Pluralism: A Non-Pluralist Response To A Pluralist Critique, Matthew Stinson

Global Tides

Religious Pluralism is the view that no one religion is correct, and no religion enjoys special status in relation to the Ultimate. Recently, Samuel Ruhmkorff has defended Religious Pluralism from what we'll call 'The Incompatibility Objection': many religions appear to make incompatible claims about ultimate reality, and therefore they cannot all be true. Ruhmkorff defends Religious Pluralism from the incompatibility problem by applying a “subsets of belief” defense that non-pluralists may use in response to denominational differences within a religion. He argues that non-pluralists are faced with denominational incompatibility within whatever religion they are asserting is uniquely true. He further …


Formal Properties As The Basis For Value In Music, Thomas B. Yee Jan 2014

Formal Properties As The Basis For Value In Music, Thomas B. Yee

Global Tides

This paper defends the thesis that value in a piece of music is based in its formal properties rather than its non-formal properties. Two arguments are presented to support this conclusion. The first argument shows that if value in music is to be objective, then it must be grounded in a piece's formal properties rather than its non-formal properties. In the second argument, a number of alternate possibilities for grounding value in music are considered and shown to miss the mark or be inadequate. Finally, a number of possible objections against the arguments and conclusion are considered and possible responses …


For What I Hate, I Do: An Investigation Of Weakness Of Will, Craig B. Knepley Jan 2013

For What I Hate, I Do: An Investigation Of Weakness Of Will, Craig B. Knepley

Global Tides

In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele's account of weakness of will (externalism) is more philosophically defensible than R. M. Hare's account (internalism). I explain why the phenomenon of weakness of will is philosophically troubling, then go on to spell out Hare and Mele's respective views. I entertain Austin's psychological objection to Hare, as well as the objection that Hare ultimately overreaches. I argue that Hare might respond to the first but not the second of these objections. I consider the free will objection to Mele's schema, in addition to Bratman's objection that such a schema is counter-intuitive. I …